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Abstract
Networked control systems could possibly constitute the next logical step in the evolution
of control, leading to the convergence of control with communication and computing. A
central challenge is that traditional digital control methods cannot be directly applied to
such systems. However, if appropriate system abstractions can be engineered, then such
methods and theory can still be utilized. Our thesis is that a well designed middleware
framework can indeed manufacture such an abstraction of virtual collocation, and thereby,
propel the further proliferation of networked control systems.
In this thesis, we present such a middleware framework for networked control systems.
Central to this framework is Etherware, a message oriented component middleware for such
systems. We begin with a detailed description of the design and architecture of Ether-
ware, and illustrate Etherware based development of networked control systems through a
fairly complex traﬃc control testbed application. Building on the middleware, we address
safety and security issues in networked control through a detailed scenario in this testbed,
implementing safety preserving security overrides. We then address the issue of providing
guarantees of overall system behavior in networked control systems. In particular, based
on established properties of sub-systems, we prove system-wide guarantees for safety and
liveness in the traﬃc control testbed.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Control systems have been designed and built since the earliest times. For instance, feedback
control was used in ﬂoat regulator mechanisms in Greece as early as 300 BC [1]. More
recently, the use of automatic feedback control in industrial processes began with James
Watt’s ﬂy-ball governor, which was developed in 1769 for controlling the speed of a steam
engine [1]. However, all these systems were mechanically operated, and developed mostly
by intuitive invention [2]. Although mathematical models were developed for some systems
such as the governor [3], a general theory for control systems was developed only in the
twentieth century.
Modern control systems are characterized by a more systematic design process. Indeed,
based on the underlying technological and theoretical frameworks, control systems developed
since the early twentieth century can be roughly classiﬁed into three generations.
The ﬁrst generation of modern control systems were analog systems. These systems were
mostly built using electronic feedback ampliﬁers as the underlying technology. Even today,
many control systems are still built using similar principles. For instance, PID controllers are
widely used as standard control components since they can be easily integrated into control
systems through well-deﬁned interfaces. Also, frequency-domain techniques pioneered by
Bode, Nyquist, and Black, have served as the theoretical basis for designing such systems
[4] [5].
The emergence of digital computers after World War II has led to a second generation
of control systems based on digital control. Computers are the primary control compo-
nents in such systems, and the underlying technology is the control software executing in
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these computers. The speed and accuracy of computers allow many system variables to be
monitored and controlled simultaneously, and the ﬂexibility and expressiveness of software
languages support the implementation of fairly complex control algorithms. The design of
these systems is governed by well understood techniques such as Kalman ﬁlters [6] and real-
time scheduling theory [7]. Today, such systems are used in the vast majority of control
applications ranging from airplane navigation to industrial process control.
We are now witnessing the emergence of a third generation of control systems, which
are operated using computer networks. These networked control systems are character-
ized by distributed control loops operating over multiple computers in a network. They
involve complex control software that needs to operate in a coordinated fashion over many
interconnected computers. For instance, a typical mid-range automobile has about 45 micro-
controllers connected by Controller Area Networks (CAN) [8]. Also, since the underlying
infrastructure is usually quite expensive, these systems usually need to share the commu-
nication and computation resources among many diﬀerent applications. As a result, these
systems are much more complicated than previous generations of control systems.
Although networked control applications are increasing, such systems are still mostly
custom-designed, and unlike earlier generations of control systems, there is still no compre-
hensive technological or theoretical framework for developing these systems. In particular,
the control software, which is the major source of complexity in these systems, is still largely
custom-made. For instance, over 60% of the software for the Boeing 777 airplane had to be
developed from scratch [9].
In this thesis, we present a middleware framework for software development in networked
control systems. We contend that such a framework is the key to the systematic design of
such systems, and could consequently lead to the proliferation of networked control. To
this end, our framework provides a comprehensive set of software primitives for application
design, as well as a software infrastructure for application development in such systems.
In particular, we promote the development of standardized and reusable networked control
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software, which will signiﬁcantly reduce design cycle times and development costs in such
systems. Finally, the application design standardization enabled through our framework,
sets the stage for the development of a theory for networked control systems as well.
Our main contributions in this thesis are:
• A message-oriented component middleware for networked control systems called Ether-
ware (Chs. 3 and 4).
• The design and implementation of a traﬃc control emulation testbed to illustrate
Etherware based application development (Ch. 5).
• The Control System Incident Response (CSIR) framework for implementing safety and
security sub-systems, and the principle of safety preserving security overrides in control
systems (Ch. 6).
• A proof of overall system-wide safety and liveness for the traﬃc control testbed based
on various sub-system level guarantees, which can possibly serve as a prototype for
other such systems (Ch. 7).
1.1 Tools, standardization, architecture, and
compatibility
We now discuss some of the main engineering concepts that we will draw upon for our
middleware framework for networked control systems. In the process, we also trace the
origins of these concepts, and illustrate their impact on the course of the history of modern
technology.
The importance of good tools can be hardly overstated in the history of human technol-
ogy. For instance, the invention of the steam engine is usually credited with starting the
industrial revolution in England. However, when the ﬁrst engines were built, there was a
3
basic engineering problem. The large cylinders of engines could not be bored with suﬃcient
precision, and a lot of power was lost to steam leaking around the pistons. This problem was
eventually solved by the invention of a precision horizontal-boring machine by John Wilkin-
son in 1775. It was this breakthrough that made steam engines viable, and emphasized the
importance of developing good tools in the subsequent revolution.
Meanwhile, the notion of standardization in manufacturing triggered the industrial rev-
olution in North America. In 1798, the US government contracted Eli Whitney to produce
10,000 muskets in two years. The actual muskets were delivered in 1808, about eight years
later than scheduled. However, Whitney delivered far more than just the muskets. He de-
veloped, and successfully applied, the “uniformity-system” to manufacture interchangeable
parts for locks of the muskets [10]. In a remarkable demonstration to President Jeﬀerson
in 1801, he assembled complete locks for muskets from random parts. Today, Whitney’s
system is considered to be the basis of standardization in manufacturing technology. In
fact, standardization is a basic premise in most industries, where products are composed of
interchangeable components developed according to well-deﬁned interfaces.
A well-designed architecture has been the central reason for the proliferation of comput-
ers today. For instance, the work of Alonzo Church and Alan Turing in the early twentieth
century, laid the theoretical foundations of sequential computing. They independently devel-
oped formal systems to deﬁne and model the notion of computable functions [11]. However,
it was John von Neumann’s subsequent ideas about organizing these concepts into an archi-
tecture that is the basis of today’s sequential computers. In particular, the stored program
concept [12] was a signiﬁcant breakthrough. It has since led to the development of simple
and uniform mechanisms to write, test, and maintain complex programs today.
The von Neumann architecture had a widespread inﬂuence on the ﬁrst generation of
digital computer engineers in the 1950s. However, even in the mid 1960s, commercial com-
puters produced by IBM, Burroughs, UNIVAC, and others were still custom built machines.
Individual computers had to be designed, built, and installed according to speciﬁc customer
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requirements. The IBM 360, ﬁrst shipped in June 1966, changed all that. The IBM 360 was
the ﬁrst commercially successful general purpose computer. In fact, the name 360 (degrees)
was intended to market its “all round” general purpose capabilities.
The 360/370 series introduced the notion of compatibility in computers [13]. All computer
hardware was built to a common set of abstractions such as instruction sets, memory models,
etc. Consequently, the same software could run on all the diﬀerent machines in this series.
This standardization tremendously reduced software development costs. More importantly,
it solved problems due to changing customer requirements by supporting seamless upgrades
of hardware and software. This architecture immediately propelled IBM to the top of the
computer market, where it stayed for over two decades after the ﬁrst 360 was produced.
These examples amply illustrate the importance of the associated engineering concepts.
Standardization allows components to be independently and eﬃciently produced, and then
assembled into customized applications. Good tools make crucial processes viable, improve
the quality of systems, and increase productivity in manufacture. Well designed architec-
tures and compatibility standards promote specialization of sub-systems, as well as their
subsequent integration into working systems.
1.2 Abstractions for networked control
In this section, we examine similar considerations for the the design of networked control
systems, and introduce some of the main abstractions underlying our middleware framework.
Let us consider the classic representation of a control system as shown in Figure 1.1(a).
A simple implementation of this system would be a modular software program implementing
the control laws and plant interfaces. However, established practice in software engineering
advocates the use of component architectures for such systems [14] [15] [16] . This consists
of decomposing the software into components as shown in Figure 1.1(b), where a component
is an autonomous software module with well-deﬁned functionality. For instance, Sensor,
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Figure 1.1: Component based software for Digital Control
Actuator, Controller, Filter, and Supervisor are all possible components for such a system.
A component based software architecture has several beneﬁts. It allows individual com-
ponents to be developed separately and integrated later, which is very important for the
development of large systems. Since components are well-deﬁned, they can also be replaced
without aﬀecting the rest of the system. For instance, a zero-order hold ﬁlter in Figure
1.1(b) can be dynamically replaced by a Kalman ﬁlter without having to change the remain-
ing software or restart an operational system. Further, such architecture promotes software
reuse, since a well designed component such as a control algorithm, tested for one system,
can be easily transplanted into another similar system.
Traditional digital control theory addresses the design of systems with tightly coupled
plants and controllers as shown in Figure 1.1. Such controllers expect periodic feedback
about plant state from sensors, and output periodic controls through actuators. This makes
the system predictable, and simpliﬁes the design of control laws. However, to obtain such pe-
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riodicity, the control software must be tightly integrated, and hard real-time deadlines must
be strictly enforced. Hence, systems engineers have relied on eﬀective scheduling algorithms
based on conservative worst-case execution deadlines [7], and dedicated communication chan-
nels such as CAN [17] and FDDI [18] that provide hard real-time guarantees.
In networked control systems, on the other hand, software components execute on multi-
ple computers connected over a general network. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, control loops
may be distributed, and related software components may need to communicate over the
network. In particular, it is diﬃcult to guarantee periodic communication with hard real-
time deadlines over best eﬀort networks such as wireless and IP based networks. Hence, it is
imperative to provide appropriate software abstractions, such as virtual collocation and local
temporal autonomy, which allow digital control theory to be applicable in such systems [19].
Virtual collocation is the abstraction that all software components execute on a sin-
gle computer. This hides details about network locations, topologies, and communication
protocols, and the control software does not have to distinguish between local and remote
components. Such an abstraction has several additional beneﬁts. Since no assumptions
are made about network locations, the same components can be reused in diﬀerent systems
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and over diﬀerent networks. In fact, components can even be dynamically migrated for
optimizing processor and network usage. Consequently, virtual collocation is not only a
simplifying abstraction for control engineers, but also a very useful construct for improving
system integration, management, and reuse.
Local temporal autonomy is a method for enhancing robustness and reliability. It consists
of ensuring that a component can execute for a small amount of time even after another
connected component has failed. For instance, using a state estimator can help a controller
tolerate delayed or lost updates from a sensor. In addition, upon a software failure, if the
sensor is restarted quickly enough, then the controller can continue executing without being
aware of this. These and other similar mechanisms [19] allow network delays, transients,
and failures to be tolerated, and help enhance the abstraction of virtual collocation.
1.3 Middleware frameworks
Middleware frameworks incorporate the engineering concepts presented in Section 1.1 quite
well. They combine well-designed architectures with useful toolkits, and promote the devel-
opment of applications with standardized and customizable interfaces. They also support
the abstraction of virtual collocation in general purpose systems. Consequently, middleware
has emerged as a preeminent framework for developing complex and distributed applications.
Major software companies such as IBM [20], Microsoft [16], and SUN [21] increasingly pro-
mote their middleware based technologies as platforms for software engineering, and many
successful applications have been developed using CORBA based architectures [22]. Today,
middleware based technologies are considered the basic ingredient in the development of
complex and distributed software systems.
Despite the considerable success of commercial middleware technologies, however, there is
still a basic problem in their use for networked control. Traditional middleware technologies
such as CORBA have been developed for transaction based applications in the banking
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and business sectors. They are based on Remote Procedure Call (RPC) semantics, which
are ideal for ensuring logical correctness of programs. However, this causes components to
block on remote function calls, which is undesirable for control applications. For instance,
a critical component such as a real-time controller cannot block on updates from remote
sensors, and would require a separate thread to block on each such sensor. This leads to
complex multi-threaded component design, which is relatively hard to develop, manage, and
verify. Further, component interfaces described in such systems cannot capture assumptions
such as interaction protocols and failure semantics. This leads to numerous problems in
systems integration, and may even cause unpredictable failures during system operation. A
middleware for control applications must address these and related issues.
These considerations have motivated our design of a middleware framework speciﬁcally
for networked controls systems, which we present in this thesis.
1.4 Organization of thesis
A middleware framework incorporates a set of architectural trade-oﬀs for its domain of ap-
plication, and in particular, the middleware itself is designed to address the infrastructural
requirements of its applications. However, these trade-oﬀs and requirements can be deter-
mined only after a detailed study of some of the applications in the domain. Consequently,
we begin by studying an exploratory implementation of a prototype traﬃc control testbed in
Chapter 2, and based on this, we develop the requirements for our middleware framework.
Central to a middleware framework is the underlying middleware itself. It incorporates
the actual architectural trade-oﬀs in the framework, and deﬁnes the set of design primitives
for its applications. Its capabilities determine the capabilities of the framework itself. Hence,
in Chapter 3, we present a detailed description of the design and architecture of Etherware,
our middleware for networked control systems, and a discuss how the software infrastructure
requirements for networked control systems are addressed therein. We complement this by
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describing the actual Etherware mechanisms for system operation and management in Chap-
ter 4, and present a comparison of Etherware to other potential middleware for networked
control systems. In particular, the descriptions in these two chapters constitute static and
dynamic pictures of Etherware respectively.
A middleware framework is usually based on an application design philosophy. It pro-
motes speciﬁc application designs and design patterns through appropriate abstractions and
services. However, it is hard to make this explicit only through middleware description and
cursory examples. Hence, we present the Etherware based design and implementation of
our traﬃc control testbed in Chapter 5. In particular, we illustrate the design of distributed
control loops, through a detailed analysis and experimental study of a representative control
loop in the testbed.
Control systems interact with the real-world, and hence, safety and security issues are
of vital concern in these systems. While sub-system level safety features are usually incor-
porated in control application design, there still are exceptional situations that may need to
addressed at a system-wide level. For instance, a security breach that compromises safety
usually requires the system to be operated in a safe-mode so that the corresponding threats
can be mitigated. Also, the security overrides employed in such situations should not com-
promise low level safety features that provide important safety guarantees in the system. In
Chapter 6, we present a systematic approach to addressing these issues in networked control
systems using our middleware framework.
In Chapter 7, we address the issue of how one may envisage providing system-wide
guarantees of safety and liveness for networked control systems. Speciﬁcally, we use sub-
system level guarantees from the previous chapters, to prove system-wide safety and liveness
guarantees in the testbed. For safety, we show that cars can be driven without collisions,
and for liveness, we show that the system can be operated without gridlocks. During this
development, we also introduce real-time scheduling policies for the renewal task model,
which we then use to develop the control model for cars in the testbed.
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Our thesis presents a middleware framework for networked control systems, but our
vision is broader. We envision general purpose control, where control loops can be set up
dynamically, and entire control systems can be assembled from toolkits of components, using
well designed frameworks, and based on well understood system theory. This extends the
notion of general purpose computing and communication, and anticipates the convergence
of control with communication and computing. We elaborate on this vision and conclude in
Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
TOWARDS NETWORKED
CONTROL PROLIFERATION
In the past few decades, we have witnessed the development of several crucial technological
enablers for networked control systems. Remarkable advances in VLSI technology, chip fabri-
cation, and hardware architecture design have resulted in the availability of microprocessors
with increasingly higher capabilities. This has signiﬁcantly changed the nature of digital
control, and enabled the use of higher performance control software for increasingly complex
applications. For instance, ZiLOG’s eZ80Acclaim [23] micro-controller used in industrial
control applications has 256KB ﬂash memory and 512KB fast SRAM. It is also supported
by a real time kernel with a TCP/IP stack for Internet connectivity.
Wireless networking technology has also matured to the point where it can provide
connectivity to embedded micro-controllers in control systems [24]. This in turn enables the
deployment of increasingly complex control algorithms in such embedded computer networks.
In addition, such software can even be updated dynamically using wireless connectivity.
Further, the integration of sensing with computation and communication capabilities has
enabled diverse new applications based on sensor networks. For instance, MICA2 [25] motes,
a recent generation of experimental sensor nodes, can store programs of up to 128 Kbytes,
and communicate at 38.4 kbps on a wireless link.
The above trends motivate signiﬁcant extensions to traditional digital control. In partic-
ular, they enable distributed control loops, where control software executes in a coordinated
fashion over networks of embedded computers in control systems. In addition, the pow-
erful computation and communication capabilities in such computer networks can support
standardized software architectures that can trade-oﬀ some performance for much better
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Figure 2.1: Traﬃc Control Testbed
software management and reuse. Consequently, such networked control systems are being
increasingly deployed in applications ranging from automobiles to air traﬃc control.
The central challenge in the proliferation of networked control systems is the development
and management of control software, and as we have argued in Section 1.3, a middleware
framework is an important ingredient in addressing this challenge. In this chapter, we study
this issue in further detail, using a prototype networked control testbed that involves traf-
ﬁc emulation through software controlled cars. In particular, we examine an exploratory
software implementation of this system, and use this to develop the requirements for a mid-
dleware framework for networked control. We conclude with a presentation of the research
context for this thesis.
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2.1 Networked control testbed
The networked control testbed, which we use as a prototype for networked control systems,
is shown in Figure 2.1. It consists of a set of remote controlled cars driven on a track. A car
has no on-board computational capabilities, and is controlled by analog signals transmitted
over a dedicated radio frequency channel. These signals control the speed and steering angle
of the car. The corresponding radio transmitter is connected to the serial port of a dedicated
laptop through a micro-controller, which converts discrete commands from the laptop into
analog controls to operate the car. Hence, a car can be controlled by varying its speed and
steering angle in discrete steps. Also, commands can be sent at a rate of up to 50 Hz, i.e.,
one command every 20ms.
Each car has a chassis top with uniquely coded color patches that are used to identify its
position and orientation. The cars are monitored using a pair of ceiling mounted cameras.
The video feed from each camera is processed by an image processing algorithm executing
on a dedicated desktop computer. This feedback is available at the rate of 10Hz, i.e., one
update every 100ms. Also, all computers in the testbed are connected by wired Ethernet. In
addition, the laptops are also connected by an ad hoc wireless network with IEEE 802.11 [26]
PCMCIA cards.
2.2 Exploratory implementation
A preliminary implementation of traﬃc control was undertaken in the testbed to understand
the various challenges involved in developing a middleware framework for such networked
control. The application architecture of this implementation is illustrated in Figure 2.2. As
shown in the ﬁgure, each car is controlled by a low-level model predictive Controller [27]. The
desired operation of the car is speciﬁed to the Controller as a trajectory, which is a sequence
of desired positions for the car at future time instants. The Controller then generates discrete
controls to drive the car along the speciﬁed trajectory. Such controls are generated every
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Figure 2.2: Software architecture of the preliminary testbed implementation
100 ms and sent to the Actuator module. The Actuator in turn sends the control to the
car via the corresponding micro-controller and radio transmitter. Vision feedback from
the image processing algorithms at the VisionSensors is collected at a VisionServer. The
VisionServer then performs data fusion and provides suitably merged feedback information
to the Controllers. This completes the low-level control loop in the system.
As noted above, the Controllers need to be given trajectories to operate the respective
cars. In the testbed, such trajectories are generated by a central Supervisor, which also
ensures global properties such as the avoidance of car collisions for safety, and the elimination
of traﬃc gridlocks for liveness. For instance, in a traﬃc control scenario, the Supervisor
generates trajectories to control the car along a pre-speciﬁed network of roads, with planning
and scheduling algorithms that are based on the analysis described in [28]. Brieﬂy, blocks
of the road network are modeled as bins in a corresponding graph. The planning problem
is then re-formulated as ﬁnding shortest paths in such a graph, and the scheduling problem
is modeled as assigning cars to bins while avoiding collisions and gridlocks. Finally, the
Supervisor also receives feedback from the VisionServer forming a higher-level control loop.
Due to hardware constraints, the Actuator component for each car, and the VisionSensor
component for each camera, must be executed on respective computers. All other compo-
nents can execute on any computer in the testbed. However, in practice, the Controllers are
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executed on the same laptop as the respective Actuators, and the Supervisor is executed on
a separate dedicated laptop.
Traﬃc scenarios with up to eight cars operating simultaneously on the track have been
tested using this implementation. The cars closely followed pre-speciﬁed trajectories in
reasonably well behaved traﬃc scenarios. Another demonstrated scenario is pursuit-evasion
in a leader-follower conﬁguration, where a set of software controlled cars follow a manually
controlled car. An automatic collision avoidance system has also been demonstrated.
2.3 Middleware framework requirements
The exploratory implementation described in Section 2.2 has helped determine some of the
common functionalities in most networked control applications. Ideally, such functionalities
should be reusable, and hence, part of the middleware framework. We now consider these
requirements in detail.
2.3.1 Operational requirements
These are the basic functionalities required for correct operation in networked control.
• Distributed operation: Connecting diverse components executing on diﬀerent com-
puters in a network usually leads to numerous problems related to such distributed
operation. These include locating components in the network, connecting related com-
ponents, and supporting the exchange of messages between connected components. For
instance, in the traﬃc control testbed, the Supervisor and the various Controllers exe-
cute on diﬀerent computers. Initializing these components, connecting the Controllers
to the Supervisor, developing protocols for their interaction, and synchronizing their
operation to resolve conﬂicts represent some of the problems arising due to distributed
operation in the testbed.
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• Location independence: This is an important abstraction that provides an ele-
gant solution to some of the problems related to distributed operation. It involves
an addressing scheme for components that is independent of their actual location in
the network. This allows components to communicate without distinguishing between
local and remote components. It also allows integrating components uniformly in dif-
ferent network conﬁgurations. For example, in the traﬃc testbed, the ability to easily
switch between wired and wireless networks, which use diﬀerent addressing schemes,
requires these details to be abstracted away from the components. Similarly, such an
abstraction supports the use of other networking technologies such as Bluetooth [29],
without having to update component code.
• Service description: Connecting related components in a network involves determin-
ing if appropriate components are executing in the system. Further, of the available
components, the most suitable component has to be selected. For instance, consider
a car controller that knows the geographic location of its car to be (10,25) in a given
coordinate system. If it needs feedback, say from a vision sensor, then the controller
should be able to connect directly to a sensor covering that location based on this
information alone. In particular, the controller should not have to know about sen-
sor locations in a network. This requires mechanisms to specify and discover services
provided by components.
• Interface compatibility: Integrating independently developed software components
almost always involves interface incompatibilities. For instance, the set of functions
deﬁned in the interface of a sensor module may not be compatible with the functions
required by a controller component. Hence, integrating the two components would re-
quire reprogramming one or both of these components. This is eliminated if standard
interfaces have been speciﬁed and supported for compatibility between such compo-
nents.
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• Semantics: A signiﬁcant problem occurs due to incongruent assumptions in the im-
plementation of components. The interaction between diﬀerent software components
is usually based on an implicit ﬁnite state machine. The exchanged messages are
assumed to be in speciﬁc formats. However, current interface description languages
such as the CORBA IDL [30] do not provide a mechanism to specify these assump-
tions properly. For example, suppose the Controller in Figure 2.2 is implemented so
that it checks for an update at the VisionServer before computing controls. This as-
sumes that the VisionServer responds immediately, returning an update if available,
and none otherwise. However, if the VisionServer is implemented so that it checks
with the VisionSensors for updates before responding, the additional delay may lead
to failure as the Controller is also waiting for an update. Hence, the Controller and
the VisionServer may have consistent interfaces, but the interaction semantics may
still be incompatible. Consequently, there must be additional provision for specifying
interaction semantics in the interface descriptions.
• Distributed time: Since components may execute on diﬀerent computers, they may
not share common clocks. Hence, there must be a mechanism to translate time be-
tween diﬀerent clocks. For example, time-stamps on remote sensor updates must be
translated to the local time for correct operation of controllers.
2.3.2 Non-functional requirements
The following features signiﬁcantly improve system behavior and performance. However,
they are not necessarily required for the correct operation of the system.
• Robustness: Robustness is a fundamental requirement for the viability of networked
control. Component failures must be contained, and their eﬀect on the overall system
should be minimized. For instance, the failure of a faulty sensor module should not
cause a connected controller to fail as well. This requires dependencies between com-
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ponents to be completely eliminated, or at least replaced by use-only relationships as
much as possible.
• Delay-reliability trade-oﬀ: Reliable delivery of data over a network introduces
additional delay due to retransmission of lost or re-ordered packets. However, some
components may not require reliable delivery, and should therefore be able to trade-
oﬀ reliability for lower average delay. For example, time-stamped sensor updates are
more useful when delays are smaller, even though a few of them may be lost over the
network.
• Security: Security is a key requirement in control systems as they interact with the
real world. However, standard security mechanisms used in information management
systems may not be directly applicable to control systems. Usually, additional con-
straints apply due to the direct interaction of such systems with the real world. For
instance, when there is a security breach in the system, a standard approach is to
suspend normal operation with a security override to address the intrusion. However,
in control systems, low-level fail-safes that guarantee system safety must not be sus-
pended as well. In fact, the implementation of such safety preserving security overrides
is a key security principle for control systems.
• Other requirements: The protocols and algorithms implemented in the middleware
framework must have good performance and scalability.
2.3.3 Management requirements
The following features considerably enhance system manageability.
• Startup: Programmable interfaces to startup procedures help ensure that all parts of
the system are initialized up correctly. In particular, such an interface must allow the
speciﬁcation of dependencies between components at startup. For instance, to ensure
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proper initialization of the plant, a controller component may have to be started up
before a related actuator component.
• System evolution: This requires the ability to update or migrate components at
run-time. Component migration is required to optimize the conﬁguration of software
components to reduce or balance communication and computational loads. For exam-
ple, a Controller in the testbed may be migrated to another computer, where it is both
closer to the corresponding Actuator and the destination is less loaded computation-
ally, thus reducing loop delay. This can and ought to be done dynamically, i.e., while
the system is running, in order to self optimize the organization of what component is
executing where. In particular, control engineers and system designers should not have
to worry about such details. Run time updates also allow operations such as changing
controllers, to address evolving plant goals, without having to restart the rest of the
system.
2.4 Research context
The basis of a middleware framework is a sound architecture that governs the organization
of software components and subsystems for the development of applications with desirable
properties. Also, the application designs supported by an architecture are a direct conse-
quence of the abstractions and programming models supported by the underlying software
infrastructure. Accordingly, well designed middleware has emerged as the most widely used
software infrastructure for distributed applications. As noted in Section 1.2, popular ap-
proaches for control are based on variants of CORBA [22] such as Real-Time CORBA [31],
Minimum CORBA [32], and Fault tolerant CORBA [30].
This section presents a brief study of relevant software infrastructures that are being used
in comparable systems. It also emphasizes the limitations of the associated frameworks vis-
a´-vis the requirements of networked control as these have motivated the main contributions
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of this thesis.
2.4.1 Domainware
A well designed software infrastructure eﬀectively captures domain-speciﬁc trade-oﬀs and
provides an appropriate set of abstractions for application design. However, distinct domains
typically have diﬀerent operating conditions and constraints, and hence the appropriate
trade-oﬀs are usually diﬀerent as well. For instance, the execution of correct transactions
is necessary for business applications, but robustness and lower delays are more important
in the control domain. This key insight guides the following considerations about software
infrastructures.
Real-Time CORBA (RT-CORBA) is representative of the class of middleware that have
emerged as a control speciﬁc modiﬁcation of pre-existing infrastructure developed for a diﬀer-
ent domain. In particular, RT-CORBA is a specialization of CORBA, which was originally
developed for business applications requiring reliable communication. Hence, an implicit
assumption in the speciﬁcation of RT-CORBA is that communication overheads are tol-
erable by control applications. Consequently, most of the speciﬁcation deals with models
for scheduling threads and providing real-time guarantees on a single node. For instance,
the notion of a distributable thread relies heavily on fast and reliable communication to
avoid deadlocks. In wireless networks, however, communication delays are unpredictable
and packet losses are high. Hence, a controller cannot depend on remote sensors through
distributable threads. Also, the problem of sensor update losses can be addressed in the
application itself by using good state estimation techniques. On the other hand, lower de-
lays are much more important for state estimation and robust control as feedback must be
available to controllers as soon as possible. Consequently, the ability to trade-oﬀ delay for
reliability is a key feature that needs to be added to RT-CORBA. Reference [33] considers
some of the other issues that need to be addressed in RT-CORBA. However, the main draw-
back with middleware such as RT-CORBA is that they inherit trade-oﬀs made for unrelated
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domains.
Forcing functions capture the main constraints of a domain, and hence, constitute major
determinants for domain-speciﬁc tradeoﬀs. We deﬁne a forcing function as a characteristic
of an application domain that must be addressed by any application level solution. For
instance, control applications operating on wireless networks are constrained by lossy links
and unpredictable delays, due to which, real-time guarantees are impossible to support in
middleware. Hence, the application itself is forced to address this issue by incorporating
complex control laws and good state estimators that adapt to network conditions. Since
applications are forced to directly address these constraints, this is a necessary cost to be
paid.
Domainware is middleware that exploits application functionality already imposed by the
forcing functions of the domain. In wireless networks, delay and bandwidth characteristics
of communication channels have high variability, and applications are forced to use good
state estimation to cope with this. In fact, they are also forced to have default safe states
to cope with the loss of a large sequence of updates due to bad channel conditions. For
example, airplanes ﬂying in autopilot mode are controlled with a Global Positioning System
(GPS) and a local Inertial Navigation System (INS). The INS is used for controlling the
airplane during normal operation. But, as the reference point of the INS drifts with time,
the GPS is used to correct it periodically. However, if communication with the GPS system
is lost, then the default mode is to ﬂy using just the INS. The key point is that airplanes,
and in general most controllers over wireless networks, are designed to handle bad channel
conditions. Domainware exploits this by relaxing its own requirements and having a much
simpler architecture. As individual components are fail-safe, more important non-functional
requirements such as fault tolerance and system evolution are addressed in a much simpler
fashion.
Etherware, the middleware presented in this thesis, has been developed as Domainware
for networked control. In particular, the forcing functions of wireless networks have been
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exploited to implement the system with soft real time mechanisms. Also, the ability of com-
ponents to accept occasional delays have been exploited to support Etherware mechanisms
for restart, upgrade, and migration as described in Chapter 4.
2.4.2 Service continuity
Control applications are subjected to numerous changes during prolonged operation. These
include involuntary changes such as faults, and voluntary changes such as software up-
grades. Since middleware based control applications are composed of interacting compo-
nents, changes aﬀecting one component must be isolated from other components that de-
pend on it. For instance, restarting or updating the Controller in Figure 2.1 should not also
require restarting the Actuator, as this might aﬀect the operation of the car. Since compo-
nents typically interact by providing services to each other, this requires service continuity
to be maintained even in the presence of changes in a component.
Fault-tolerant CORBA [30] is a variant of CORBA that addresses service continuity
during component failures. This is provided mainly by object replication and support for
restarts. However, the mechanisms require at least one replicated server object to be opera-
tional for a procedure call from a client to be successful. If no server replica is available, then
an exception is raised in the client due to Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) based semantics.
However, during failures due to logical errors in software, all replicas of a component will
need to be restarted. Hence, such a failure will aﬀect clients as well. Further, CORBA
variants do not support service continuity during component upgrades, and do not support
migration at all.
Etherware supports service continuity by providing eﬃcient restart, upgrade, and migra-
tion mechanisms. As demonstrated by the experiments in Chapter 4, the involved delays
are well within the bounds required by the testbed. Further, such communication channels
are preserved across component restarts and upgrades. This allows other components to
continue operating despite such changes. In particular, communication channels need not
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be reestablished after component restarts or upgrades.
2.4.3 Operational semantics
Interface description languages (IDLs) provided with CORBA, Jini, and other popular mid-
dleware mainly address the speciﬁcation of functional interfaces, which are the declarations
of function calls implemented by components. However, component behavior cannot be spec-
iﬁed using these IDLs. Consequently, operational speciﬁcs such as communication protocols
and failure modes of component implementations cannot be made explicit. For example,
suppose an actuator component accepts control updates through the function update() in
its interface. This may be implemented so that it accepts control updates most of the time,
but raises an exception when update() is called at the same time as it is actually sending
controls to its actuator device. However, a controller communicating with the actuator may
assume such an exception to indicate failure and reset itself, thus leading to persistent faulty
behavior. As most documentation is imprecise, such implicit assumptions make reusing
components and integrating systems extremely diﬃcult.
Many formal methods for system speciﬁcation have been adapted for real-time systems
[34]. For example, Statecharts [35] [36], a graphical language for specifying real-time systems,
extends ﬁnite state machine descriptions by introducing composition operators such as AND
and OR. In addition, some of these methods have also been used to extend the CORBA IDL
to support the speciﬁcation of operational semantics. For instance, TRIO/CORBA [37] [38]
is based on TRIO [39], a ﬁrst order temporal logic, while Cooperative Objects (CO) [40] [41]
is an object oriented dialect of Petri Nets. Also, SpecTRM [42] [43] is a fairly comprehensive
framework for safety critical systems speciﬁcation. However, a major drawback with most of
these tools is that they are not very well integrated with commercial middleware frameworks
for control systems.
The middleware framework proposed in this thesis supports an IDL for the speciﬁcation
of operational semantics of components. In particular, aspects of a component’s behavior
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that are relevant to other components can be speciﬁed. This includes the speciﬁcation of
interaction protocols and types of message exchanged between components. Such support
should help eliminate a lot of the problems arising due to implicit assumptions about com-
ponent behavior.
2.4.4 Other related work
As noted above, popular middleware based approaches for networked control build on vari-
ants of CORBA. For instance, Open Control Platform [44] is based on Real Time CORBA,
and has been used to control unmanned aerial vehicles. OCP builds on top of a CORBA
implementation by adding a Controls API, which provides the abstraction of components
communicating by sending and receiving events through ports. This is similar to the Ether-
ware programming model, but it also inherits the drawbacks of RT-CORBA noted in Section
2.4.1. CoSMIC [45] is another middleware for distributed real-time and embedded applica-
tions. It extends the Model Driven Architecture of OMG, and is based on an implementation
of Real Time CORBA as well.
Other interesting approaches include the Giotto [46] system for embedded control appli-
cations, real-time framework [47] for robotics and automation, and OSACA [48] for automa-
tion. A fairly comprehensive overview of research and technology of software architectures
for control systems is provided in [49].
Finally, several of the architectural constructs in Etherware have been inﬂuenced by J-
Sim [50] [51], a component based, compositional simulation environment. In particular, the
loosely coupled component programming model, and the autonomous component architec-
ture in J-Sim have a similar conceptual basis to the corresponding aspects of Etherware.
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Chapter 3
ETHERWARE
In this chapter, we present Etherware, the underlying infrastructure for our middleware
framework for networked control systems. We present the main considerations inﬂuencing
the design of Etherware, and describe the Etherware programming model and architecture.
In particular, the programming model highlights the abstractions and design primitives sup-
ported by Etherware, and the architecture illustrates how middleware design considerations
have been incorporated in its implementation. We conclude with a discussion of how the
requirements of Section 2.3 are addressed in Etherware.
3.1 Architectural considerations
The design of Etherware has been considerably motivated by experiences with the ex-
ploratory testbed implementation described in Section 2.2. These and other considerations
that have inﬂuenced the Etherware architecture are presented in this section.
3.1.1 Application design
The implementation of control loops over a network is a complex problem. This is further
complicated in wireless networks due to high losses and unpredictable delays. However, these
limitations cannot be addressed entirely by infrastructure based mechanisms, since such
mechanisms would necessarily have to make trade-oﬀs that aﬀect application performance
as well. For instance, reliable delivery of packets can be provided only with increased delays,
which would then aﬀect the performance of control loops in the system. Hence, applications
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Figure 3.1: Enhanced design of the lower-level control loop in testbed
would either have to tolerate packet losses or increased delays.
Application design constraints are largely determined by the forcing functions of their
domain, as described in Section 2.4.1. For networked control systems, a key forcing function
is the lossy and delay-prone wireless channels used for communication. In the testbed,
these constraints have led to various design enhancements to the software architecture of
the testbed in Figure 2.2. For instance, enhancements to the lower-level control loop are
shown in Figure 3.1. As shown in the ﬁgure, a Kalman Filter [6] is used in the Controller to
reduce the impact of losses in sensory feedback. Similarly, a Control Buﬀer in the Actuator
stores future commands to tolerate delayed or lost updates from the Controller. Chapter 5
considers these and other modiﬁcations to the testbed in detail.
The main idea behind the modiﬁcations to the testbed design is the reduction of network
based dependencies between components by increasing their Local temporal autonomy. For
example, the Kalman Filter allows the Controller to tolerate losses in sensory feedback,
and the Control Buﬀer stores alternate controls for the Actuator to provision for delayed
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or lost Controller updates. This approach to application design has greatly inﬂuenced the
architecture of Etherware. Since such local temporal autonomy allows critical components to
endure some delays, Etherware has been developed assuming only soft real time control. In
particular, this has shifted our focus from enforcing hard real-time guarantees, to supporting
non-functional requirements such as fault-tolerance and software manageability.
3.1.2 Stability considerations
Robustness can be enhanced by, and even require, the ability to eﬃciently restart failed
application components. For instance, suppose the Controller in Figure 3.1 fails due to a
computation error. Restarting this component should not require reestablishing communica-
tion channels with the VisionServer, reinitializing the Actuator, or re-establishing Controller
state, as these delays could themselves cause system instabilities, and thus result in car col-
lisions.
The need for evolution of software in the system requires the ability to update components
at run-time, i.e., while the system is executing. System optimization requires the ability to
migrate components, also at run-time. Further, upgrade and migration must be done in
an application aware fashion, so that the corresponding instabilities are minimized. For
example, updating or migrating a Controller, without informing it that loop delays will
consequently be reduced, can actually lead to instability or poor performance. All these
requirements have motivated a simple and uniform design to externalize component state.
This involves a mechanism to represent and capture the current state of a component so
that it can be reinitialized with this state if it needs to be restarted at the same node, or
even migrated to a diﬀerent location and restarted there. This allows Etherware to capture
component state, and use this to restart, update, or migrate components while maintaining
system stability.
Etherware enforces component state externalization as a basic architectural precept.
Each component is instantiated with an initial state, and is required to support a state
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check-pointing mechanism. On a check-point request, it has to return a state object that
can be used to reinitialize it upon restart, update, or migration. This is in contrast to a
mechanism where such a requirement is optional, or even a special feature supported by
additional middleware enhancements.
Components typically maintain several communication channels with other components.
For smooth operation, restarting or upgrading of components should not require such chan-
nels to be re-established, and in particular, channels should be maintained across such
changes. For example, if the Supervisor in Figure 2.2 is restarted, updated, or migrated, the
connected Controllers should not have to reestablish communication channels with the new
Supervisor. Consequently, maintenance of communication channels across such changes is
also supported in Etherware, and in particular, identiﬁers for communication channels can
be saved as part of check-pointed state. This allows restarted or upgraded components to
continue using previously established channels. More importantly, it provides continuity of
communication to other connected components during such changes.
3.1.3 Message-oriented communication
Control systems have fairly strict safety requirements. Components have to respond to
changes as soon as possible. For example, upon detecting a safety violation, a Controller
may not be able to wait for an acknowledgment from a Supervisor before it decides to take
some safe action. Over a wireless channel in particular, delays can be fairly large due to
deep fading and queued packets.
Conventional middleware for transaction based systems such as CORBA [30] are based
on a synchronous mode of communication where components interact by making remote
procedure calls. In this approach, the caller is blocked until it receives a reply from the
callee. However, this may lead to complex multi-threaded component design in push-based
communication channels commonly used in control applications. For instance, consider a
controller operating multiple actuators over a wireless network. Since the network can have
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unpredictable delays, the controller should not be blocked while sending controls to any of
the actuators. This would require a multi-threaded controller design with one thread to send
controls to each actuator so that the main control loop does not block on the remote calls.
The above problem is addressed by providing an asynchronous mode of operation, wherein
the caller is not blocked on a procedure call. For example, CORBA supports this by one-
way functions. However, since this is the prevalent mode of operation in control systems,
most communication would occur in the asynchronous mode. Hence, the additional over-
head of supporting sparingly used synchronous communication as the default mode can be
eliminated. Consequently, Etherware has been developed as a message-oriented middleware.
Messaging based communication requires a speciﬁcation of message formats. Also, sup-
port for interface and semantic compatibility during changes, and component reuse, requires
this speciﬁcation to be ﬂexible, extensible, and backward compatible. Flexibility is the
ability to easily incorporate changes in the interface and semantics of a component, and ex-
tensibility implies ease of adding speciﬁcations for new functionality while still honoring the
original speciﬁcations used by older components. Based on these requirements, Etherware
uses XML [52] as the language for messages. All communication in Etherware is through
messages, which are well-formed XML documents with appropriately deﬁned formats. For
platform independence, and due to availability of support for XML, Etherware has been
implemented using the Java programming language [53]. While these choices incur some ad-
ditional processing overhead, advances in computer hardware and the use of open standards
more than compensate.
3.1.4 Architecture
The need to support system evolution has motivated a basic design choice in Etherware.
All components on a given node are managed in a single process, and a component can
have its own additional threads of control if necessary. This allows a ﬁne grained control on
the execution life cycle of components. It also provides communication savings by reducing
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expensive memory copy operations required to transfer data between diﬀerent processes on
the same node.
The services provided by middleware should also be restartable and upgradeable. This
allows basic versions of services to be deployed initially for resource savings, which can then
be dynamically updated based on changing application requirements. To accomplish this,
invariant aspects of Etherware that cannot be changed dynamically have to be minimized.
The above considerations have motivated a micro-kernel [54] based design for Etherware.
This concept proposes the use of a simple, eﬃcient, and robust kernel that constitutes the
system invariant that will not require changes during operation. For Etherware, this includes
primitives for managing component life-cycles and delivery of messages between them. All
other functionality is implemented just as other application components, and hence they can
be restarted or upgraded without having to restart the system.
Pursuant to the above philosophy of ﬂexibility, a bare minimum functional interface has
been imposed for interactions between components and Etherware as well. This minimizes
the dependence of component design on the Etherware architecture, due to which the latter
can be modiﬁed with minimum corresponding changes required in the former. For uniformity,
application components also interact with middleware services through messages.
3.2 Etherware programming model
An Etherware based application is composed of a set of components. The components
collaborate by exchanging messages with each other. However, each component interacts
directly with Etherware, and all messages are delivered by Etherware to respective compo-
nents. However, for simplicity, the role of Etherware is abstracted out in the rest of this
section, and components are shown to interact directly with each other.
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Figure 3.2: Application model in Etherware
3.2.1 Application model
The possible interaction of a typical component in a networked control application is shown
in Figure 3.2. Each such component encapsulates a control law, which represents the appli-
cation logic associated with its functionality. As shown in Figure 3.3, this may include a set
of equations for a controller, inputs from a sensor device, or output to an actuator device.
A generic component in a networked control application can interact with other compo-
nents by participating in the following:
• Control hierarchy: A control hierarchy in Figure 3.2 is shown as a vertical stack
of components, where a “higher” level component sends controls to a “lower” level
component and obtains feedback from it. For example, the Controller in Figure 2.2
takes goals from the higher-level Supervisor and sends commands to the lower-level
Actuator.
• Data ﬂow: A data ﬂow is shown as a horizontal chain of components in Figure
3.2, where an input component sends data to an output component. For example,
the VisionServer of Figure 2.2 takes inputs from VisionSensors and provides sensor
updates to the Controllers.
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Figure 3.3: Typical application components in Networked Control Systems
3.2.2 Messages
Based on the considerations of Section 3.1.3, Etherware has been designed as a message
oriented middleware. Hence, in Etherware based applications, components communicate by
exchanging messages that are well formed XML documents [52]. XML documents can be
directly manipulated as large strings. However, Etherware also provides a hierarchy of Java
classes to manipulate these documents. The classes provide various primitives to manipulate
the underlying XML document across a Java based interface. Further, each class encodes
the XML format of a speciﬁc message type in Etherware. This hierarchy can also be easily
extended to deﬁne additional message types with user-deﬁned XML formats.
Two basic problems attending message delivery in distributed systems are discovery and
identiﬁcation of destination components. The identiﬁcation problem is solved in Etherware
by associating a globally unique id called a Binding to each component. The discovery
problem is addressed by associating service descriptions called ServiceProﬁles to addressable
components. A component can register multiple ServiceProﬁles, and multiple components
can register the same ServiceProﬁle. In the latter case, a given ServiceProﬁle is identiﬁed
with one of the corresponding components, and hence ServiceProﬁles do not uniquely identify
components.
A ServiceProﬁle describes a speciﬁc service that a component provides. For example, a
VisionSensor could register a Proﬁle specifying that it operates a gray-scale camera covering
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the geographic region between coordinates (0,0) and (100,50), and tracks car positions based
on this. Suppose a car Controller knows the location of its car to be within coordinates
(25,37) and (45,52). It could use only this information to connect to a relevant vision
sensor using an appropriate service query. Etherware would then match this query with the
description of the VisionSensor, and forward the connection message to it. Note that the
car controller need not specify the type of camera in its query, as this is irrelevant to the
service it needs.
All messages in Etherware have the following three constituents as XML tags:
• Proﬁle: This is used to determine the recipient of the message. A Proﬁle can be one
of the following:
– ServiceProﬁle: Addressing messages using ServiceProﬁles allows components
to communicate without having to identify recipients. For example, for a one-
time request response operation, a client need not discover a server’s Binding
before communicating with it. However, successive messages may be delivered
to diﬀerent components that have registered matching ServiceProﬁles as these do
not uniquely identify components.
– Binding: This causes messages to be directly routed to the component with the
given Binding. This is the preferred method for sending multiple messages as it
ensures that all the messages are sent to the same component. In addition, this
also reduces the overhead of matching ServiceProﬁles for each message.
– Tap: This is a special kind of Binding associated with an end-point of a Mes-
sageStream. For instance, when a component has opened several MessageStreams
to another component, each such stream is identiﬁed by its associated Tap. Mes-
sageStreams are described in detail in Section 3.2.4.
• Content: This represents the contents of the message. All application speciﬁc infor-
mation is contained in this tag. This can have application deﬁned formats and is not
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Figure 3.4: Programming model for a component in Etherware
processed by Etherware.
• Time-stamp: Each message has a time-stamp specifying when the message was gen-
erated. As a message moves from one node to another, the time-stamp is automatically
translated to the local time of corresponding node. However, any time-stamps in the
content tag will not be translated, and so any such time-stamp should be relative to
the time-stamp of the message for proper interpretation.
3.2.3 Components
The design of a generic component in Etherware is shown in Figure 3.4. This design is
based on several design patterns [55], where “a design pattern is a solution to a problem in
a context” [55]. In software development, several problems may have a common recurring
theme. Design patterns represent solutions to such problems that exploit the recurring
theme. However, the solutions need to elaborated based on the context of the given problem.
Accordingly, the design patterns shown in Figure 3.4 have the following rationale:
• Memento: Support for restarts and upgrades requires the ability to capture compo-
nent state. This is addressed using the Memento pattern, based on which component
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state can be externalized as a Memento object, check-pointed, and then used for re-
initialization.
• Strategy: System evolution requires the ability to replace components dynamically.
In particular, this requires the functional (syntactic) interface of the old and new
components to be compatible, so that a replacement does not require changing the rest
of the system. This is an application of the Strategy pattern, whereby all components
communicate with Etherware using the same functional interface. During component
replacement, the Strategy pattern is used in conjunction with the Memento pattern
for check-pointing component state.
• Facade: Application components interact with Etherware services by exchanging mes-
sages. However, if components have to directly interact with the corresponding sub-
systems, then the Etherware architecture needs to be exposed to component code.
This introduces unnecessary dependencies and makes components and Etherware hard
to evolve, as changing the Etherware architecture will require software of all the com-
ponents to be updated as well. This dependence is eliminated by using the Facade
pattern to provide a uniform functional interface and abstract away the architectural
details of Etherware.
Based on the above design, components are required to interact with Etherware across
a ﬁxed functional interface. This speciﬁes the set of functions that a component may call in
Etherware and the set of call-backs that it must implement. However, the actual semantics
of component interaction is determined by the messages that are exchanged during these
function calls. Hence, the operational interface of a component is determined by the types
of messages that it can generate or process, and not the actual functions used for sending
or receiving them.
Components in Etherware based applications must belong to one of the following types:
36
• Passive components: These do not have active threads of control. They are only
activated by call-backs triggered by incoming messages. Also, they can send messages
only by returning them during a call-back from Etherware.
Passive components are required to implement the following interface:
public interface Component {
/** This initializes the Component. */
public List<Message> initialize(Memento memento, Binding binding);
/** This processes an incoming Message. */
public List<Message> process(Message message, Binding binding);
/** This terminates the Component and captures its state. */
public Memento terminate();
}
This interface requires passive components to implement the following call-backs:
– initialize(): This is called when the component is ﬁrst created. The component
is initialized with a Memento, which is a special kind of Message that contains
component state. This can either be a pre-speciﬁed initial state for a newly
created component, or a compatible check-pointed state returned in a terminate()
method by a previous component. The Binding of this component is also passed
as a parameter during initialization.
– process(): This is called when a component has an incoming message to process.
The Binding of the sender of this message is also passed as a parameter. The
implemented function can return a list of generated Messages.
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– terminate(): This is used to terminate a component and capture its state so that
it can be restarted, upgraded, or migrated. Accordingly, this method must return
a Memento that can then be used to a re-initialize a compatible component.
• Active components: These have one or more independent threads of control. They
can generate messages during call-backs as well as based on activities in their own
threads of control. For instance, the VisionSensor of Figure 2.2 can be implemented
as an active component with a separate thread that waits for camera updates and
generates update messages when new sensor data is available.
Active components are required to implement the following interface:
public interface ActiveComponent extends Component {
/** Activate the independent threads of control. */
public List<Message> activate(Messenger messenger, Scheduler scheduler);
}
This interface requires active components to implement the call-backs listed above for
passive components as well. In addition, they must implement the activate() call-back
in which independent threads of control can be activated using the Scheduler interface.
In addition, the Messenger interface can be used to send messages generated by the
independent threads of control in the component.
3.2.4 MessageStreams
Messages addressed with ServiceProﬁles and component Bindings are delivered reliably and
in order by Etherware. However, as noted in Section 2.4.1, control applications need the
ability to trade-oﬀ reliable delivery for low delays. This is supported by the notion of
MessageStreams in Etherware. A MessageStream identiﬁes a stream of messages from a
source component to a sink component and supports various quality of service requirements
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for messages delivered through it. For instance, a feedback MessageStream from a Sensor to
a Controller shown in Figure 3.5 can have unreliable and in-order delivery.
The source and sink components of a MessageStream are associated with corresponding
Taps, which are special Bindings that identify access points into the MessageStream. In
particular, the source component must address its messages to its source Tap for delivery
over the MessageStream, and messages received by the sink component have its sink Tap as
the sender of these messages.
A MessageStream is a ﬁrst-class entity in Etherware. This means that messages can
also be directly addressed to a MessageStream. However, such messages are processed by
the Etherware entity associated with the source Tap and are not forwarded to the source
component. In addition, a MessageStream can also be associated with a ServiceProﬁle, which
is set as the proﬁle for all messages delivered over the MessageStream. More speciﬁcally, the
source component sets the proﬁle of its messages to its source Tap, which is then reset to
the given ServiceProﬁle when the messages are delivered over the MessageStream to the sink
component. In particular, messages addressed to the ServiceProﬁle of the MessageStream
are processed by the source Tap entity, and are not forwarded to the associated components.
3.2.5 MulticastStreams
MessageStreams are extremely useful for streams of messages from speciﬁed source com-
ponents to sink components. However, a key limitation is that only one sender and one
receiver can be associated with a MessageStream. Hence, Etherware supports Multicast-
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Streams to address situations where more than two components are associated with a stream
of messages. A MulticastStream is a group communication primitive that allows a group of
components to interact by exchanging related messages. For instance, a MulticastStream
between three components is shown in Figure 3.6. In this example, there is one sender, a
VisionSensor, sending feedback updates to multiple receivers, a Supervisor and a Controller.
However, a MulticastStream can have multiple senders and receivers, and in particular, a
component can both send and receive messages over a MulticastStream.
Similar to the MessageStreams described in Section 3.2.4, all components associated
with a MulticastStream have corresponding Taps as well. However, these Taps can be used
both to send and receive messages into the MulticastStream. More speciﬁcally, a sender
addresses its messages to its corresponding Tap, and these messages are delivered to all
other components associated with the MulticastStream. In particular, the sender does not
get a copy of the message that it sent.
MulticastStreams are ﬁrst class entities in Etherware, and hence a MulticastStream is
associated with a ServiceProﬁle as well. Consequently, components join a MulticastStream
by sending appropriate join messages addressed to the associated ServiceProﬁle. However,
as noted before, senders must address multicast messages to the corresponding Taps. In
particular, messages addressed to the ServiceProﬁle of the MulticastStream are processed in
Etherware itself, and are not multicast to other components. Finally, the proﬁles of delivered
messages are reset to the ServiceProﬁle of the MulticastStream as is done in MessageStreams.
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3.2.6 Filters
Evolving operating conditions usually require appropriate changes in the application software
as well, and the ability to upgrade component software in Etherware supports such changes.
But in many cases, it may not be necessary to completely replace existing components, and
adding an additional component that ﬁlters some of the exchanged messages is suﬃcient.
For instance, updates from the VisionSensor could get noisy due to bad lighting conditions.
This can be addressed by dynamically adding a Kalman Filter to the MessageStream from
the VisionSensor to the Controller as shown in Figure 3.7. This approach is preferable to
updating the Controller itself as the Kalman Filter is a simple component with well-deﬁned
functionality, while the Controller is much more complicated component and hence more
diﬃcult to change. More importantly, this change only aﬀects the communication between
the VisionSensor and Controller, and in particular, is transparent to both these components.
Filters are components that intercept messages sent or received by other components,
and any component can register to be a Filter of another ﬁrst class Etherware entity such
as a component or a MessageStream. Also, to add itself as a Filter, a component just sends
an appropriate add-ﬁlter message to Etherware. If successful, then an appropriate Tap is
returned to the component, which is then used to receive and forward intercepted messages.
In particular, a component Filter intercepts all messages sent and received by a component,
while a MessageStream Filter only intercepts messages sent over the MessageStream. Finally,
MulticastStreams do not support Filters as the set of receivers is not known due to broadcast
semantics, and messages received by individual components can be intercepted by component
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ﬁlters if necessary.
3.3 Etherware architecture
The architecture of Etherware is based on the micro-kernel concept as noted in Section 3.1.
In particular, all the application components on a given node are managed in a single OS
process whose conﬁguration is shown in Figure 3.8. According to the micro-kernel concept,
the process is managed by a simple Kernel, and all other functionality is implemented as
application level components. This section describes the main Etherware entities and services
in detail.
3.3.1 Kernel
As illustrated in Figure 3.8, at the heart of each Etherware process is its Kernel, which
represents the minimum invariant entity in Etherware. This implies that all other aspects of
Etherware can be changed dynamically with minimal impact to the system. It also allows
Etherware to be highly customizable and reconﬁgurable, as only the required services can
be used initially, and additional services can be added later as necessary.
The Kernel is simple, robust, and eﬃcient, as it implements only two basic functionalities:
1. Component management: The Kernel manages all the components in the associ-
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ated Etherware process. It can also accept messages to dynamically add new compo-
nents as necessary.
2. Message delivery: The Kernel delivers messages to local components in the associ-
ated Etherware process. In particular, it only delivers messages addressed to Bindings
of the components that are managed by it. All other messages are forwarded to special
components called ProﬁleRegistry and NetworkMessenger, which are standard Ether-
ware services described later in the section.
3.3.2 Scheduler
The Kernel has a separate Scheduler as shown in Figure 3.8. In Etherware, the Scheduler
is responsible for scheduling messages delivered to local components. In addition, it also
creates and manages threads in active components. Hence, the Scheduler determines the
priorities and order of all activities in Etherware.
The Scheduler also provides a very useful notiﬁcation service that simpliﬁes a lot of
application design. Many components in a control system need to sleep and wake up after a
given delay. For instance, the car Controller of Figure 2.1 needs to be woken up every 100ms
to generate a new set of controls. One solution is to have a separate thread for the Controller
with a sleep function that is called periodically to sleep for the required duration. However,
a simpler solution is to send periodic messages to the Controller to activate it as necessary.
This also simpliﬁes the Controller design as it eliminates the need to have a separate thread.
The Scheduler generates two kinds of notiﬁcation messages:
• Alarms: These are one-time wake up messages generated after a given waiting in-
terval. They are useful to components that need to wait for a given amount of time
before performing an operation. For example, a Controller, which needs to wait for an
Actuator to be initialized, can register to receive an Alarm after the required delay.
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• Ticks: These are periodic messages generated in a tick stream, and can be used
by passive components for periodic activations. In particular, this has been used to
implement all soft real-time control in the testbed. For instance, the car Controller
in Figure 2.2 operates at 10 Hz and has been implemented as a passive component.
For periodic activation, the Controller registers with the notiﬁcation service to receive
periodic tick messages at 100ms intervals.
3.3.3 Shells
All components in Etherware are encapsulated by corresponding Shells as shown in Figure
3.8. A Shell presents a facade to the component, and performs the call-backs for component
initialization, activation, termination, and message delivery. It also maintains component
speciﬁc information such as associations with other components and participation in Mes-
sageStreams and MulticastStreams. Further, Shells implement all the functionalities asso-
ciated with the Taps described in Section 3.2. Finally, most of the activities involved in
component restart, upgrade, and migration are also performed by Shells.
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, all other functionality in Etherware is implemented in
service components. In particular, each Etherware process has a corresponding component
for each of these services. The rest of the section describes the basic services used during
the normal operation of Etherware.
3.3.4 Delivery addresses
As described in Section 3.2, components can address messages using various kinds of Pro-
ﬁles such as ServiceProﬁles, Bindings, and Taps. However, these are only descriptive iden-
tiﬁcations of the corresponding components. For actual message delivery, a component is
internally identiﬁed in Etherware by its delivery address. More speciﬁcally, the descriptive
Proﬁles used by components are internally mapped to appropriate delivery addressed before
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they are actually delivered to the receivers.
The delivery address of a component consists of two parts:
• Local part: This is the globally unique Binding assigned to the component when it
is created by the Kernel. As noted in Section 3.3.1, this is also the part used by the
Kernel to deliver messages to local components that it manages.
• Network part: This is the network speciﬁc part of the delivery address. In particular,
this is the network address to which messages from remote components must be sent
over the network.
3.3.5 NetworkMessenger
The NetworkMessenger service is responsible for sending and receiving messages over the
network. Consequently, it encapsulates all network speciﬁc information such as network
addresses and protocols, and abstracts this away from the rest of Etherware. In particular,
it speciﬁes the network part of the delivery address of a component, which is basically the
network address at which its local NetworkMessenger component receives messages using
the network speciﬁc protocols.
Since all network speciﬁc information is encapsulated in the NetworkMessenger, this
component needs to be used only if the system operates over a network. In addition, this
abstraction also makes it quite simple to port Etherware to a diﬀerent network technology
as it only involves implementing a NetworkMessenger for the target network. Finally, the
NetworkMessenger is an active component as it needs separate threads to receive messages
from remote nodes.
3.3.6 ProﬁleRegistry
ProﬁleRegistry is the service that bridges the gap between the Etherware programming
model and internal conventions. In particular, it maps ServiceProﬁles and Bindings of
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components to their delivery addresses. So, when a new component is created by the Kernel,
its Binding is also registered with the ProﬁleRegistry. Further, when messages are addressed
with ServiceProﬁles, they are forwarded by the Kernel to the ProﬁleRegistry by default.
The ProﬁleRegistry then performs a lookup to map these Proﬁles to appropriate delivery
addresses of matching components if any.
In the current implementation, each Etherware process has exactly one of the following
kinds of ProﬁleRegistry components:
• Global ProﬁleRegistry: There is at least one such component in the network, and
it maintains Proﬁles of components in all nodes of the network.
• Local ProﬁleRegistry: This registers and looks up Proﬁles of only the local com-
ponents in the process. Hence, messages addressed to ServiceProﬁles of non-local
components are forwarded to a Global ProﬁleRegistry for further lookup. In addition,
a Local ProﬁleRegistry also updates the Global ProﬁleRegistry with all registered local
Proﬁles.
3.3.7 Network Time Service
In control systems, the time at which an observation or actuation occurred is as important
as the action itself [56] [19]. Hence, multiple clocks in a distributed system pose a serious
problem, as the same event is recorded with diﬀerent time-stamps in diﬀerent computers.
For instance, the time-stamp of an observation at a remote sensor is not very useful at a
controller if they use diﬀerent clocks.
This problem of distributed time can be addressed in two ways. The ﬁrst approach
is to synchronize all clocks in the system using a standard time synchronization protocol
such as NTP [57]. However, this approach has the drawback that all computers in the
system need to be in the same administrative domain. This can be particularly problematic
if interacting components are in diﬀerent administrative domains whose clocks cannot be
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Figure 3.9: Message exchanges in Control Time Protocol algorithm
synchronized. The second approach is to translate time-stamps of messages as they move
from one computer to another. Since this approach does not have the drawbacks of the time
synchronization approach in multi-domain systems, it has been used in Etherware.
The NetworkTimeService (NTS) is the Etherware service that translates time-stamps of
messages as they are transmitted from one node to another. In particular, a time-stamp
tremote generated on a remote node is translated to a local time-stamp tlocal using the relation:
tremote = α tlocal + β (3.1)
In the above equation, the coeﬃcient α represents the skew between clocks, and β
represents the oﬀset. These coeﬃcients are computed using the Control Time Protocol
(CTP) [56] [58] as follows. The local NTS component periodically sends a ping message,
which is responded to by the corresponding remote component as shown in Figure 3.9. As-
suming symmetric delays, the remote ping time tp is aligned with the midpoint between
the send time ts, and receive time tr on the local node. The coeﬃcients α and β are then
computed using a windowed least-squares approach [59], where a best-ﬁt line representing
the skew and oﬀset between the nodes is computed. If the delays are indeed symmetric, the
algorithm gives exact estimates. However, if the delays are asymmetric or noisy, the error is
still less than half the round-trip delay time [56].
Based on the above mechanisms, each NTS component builds a table of skews and oﬀsets
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for every other Etherware process on the network. In particular, these entries are tabulated
according to the Bindings of the corresponding remote NTS components. Hence, given
a time-stamp with the Binding of the associated remote NTS component, the local NTS
component can translate it to the local clock using this table.
The mechanism by which actual message time-stamps are translated in Etherware is
also quite interesting. The NTS component is initially added as a Filter to the local Net-
workMessenger, and all messages that are sent to and received from remote components are
intercepted. The local NTS component then ﬁlters outgoing messages to add its Binding to
their time-stamps. Similarly, incoming messages are also ﬁltered by the local NTS compo-
nent, which translates the time-stamp based on the associated Binding and the table it has
built up.
The main advantages of the time translation mechanism in Etherware are that the NTS
component itself does not need to understand network addresses, and the NetworkMessenger
does not need to know about time translation. Also, the natural use of component message
ﬁltering in Etherware may be noted.
3.4 Etherware based formalization
Most networked control application designs can be eﬃciently implemented using the various
primitives of the Etherware programming model described in Section 3.2. However, these
design descriptions are usually not formal speciﬁcations that can be used to prove proper-
ties such as safety and liveness in the system. In particular, the inter-component message
interactions may have inconsistencies that cannot be easily detected. Hence, it is imperative
to formally specify and verify component designs and interactions to ensure correct system
operation.
Formal languages such as process algebras, Petri nets, and rewriting logic are widely used
for system design, speciﬁcation, and veriﬁcation. However, such speciﬁcations usually have
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to be implemented in an appropriate programming language to be tested in an operational
system. This approach has several disadvantages: the implementation may not faithful
to the formal speciﬁcation, the implementation itself cannot be formally veriﬁed, and the
additional steps increase design cycle times. In this section, we describe the explicit support
in the Etherware based framework to bridge this gap between formal speciﬁcations and rapid
prototyping.
3.4.1 Formal application design
The interface of a component is the aspect of its behavior that aﬀects other components that
interact with it. For Etherware based components, this is the internal model of component
behavior, and the set of messages that it sends and receives. Such interfaces are usually
speciﬁed and analyzed using formal languages with corresponding primitives. In the follow-
ing, we present a methodology for specifying Etherware based component interfaces using
Maude [60], a high performance reﬂective language and system which supports equational
and rewriting logic.
The complete interface of a given component is usually not required to interact with it.
Typically, other components only need speciﬁc subsets of this interface for their interaction.
For instance, while implementing the Controller component of the testbed in Figure 2.1, it
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is suﬃcient to know the type of control messages that the Actuator consumes. Details about
interactions between the Actuator and other components are not relevant. Consequently,
the interface speciﬁcation must clearly delineate the subset of the Actuator interface that is
relevant to the Controller.
The following concepts capture the above notion of a component interface:
• Protocols: The interaction between components is captured in formally deﬁned pro-
tocols. For example, the communication protocol used between the Controller and
Actuator components of the testbed is shown in Figure 3.10. This speciﬁes that both
components begin in the Start state. The Controller then moves to the Send state
and begins to send ControlMessage updates. Similarly, the Actuator goes to the
Receive state, and can receive ControlMessages only after it is in this state. The
overbar indicates the reception of a message. Note that this protocol speciﬁes only the
aspect of Actuator behavior that is relevant to the Controller, and vice versa.
• Roles: The protocol described in Figure 3.10 involves two components interacting in
a prescribed manner. These constitute the roles in this protocol. Note that any two
components can participate in this protocol as long as they honor their corresponding
roles. In general, we can specify multi-party protocols with corresponding roles for
each of the participants.
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• Interface: A component participates in one or more protocols by assuming a speciﬁc
role in each protocol. The component interface is then a combination of these roles. For
example, Figure 3.11 speciﬁes the actual interface of the Actuator component in the
testbed. We see that the Actuator role in the protocol of Figure 3.10 is implemented
by substituting the Receive state with two states, namely Receive and Operate. The
interface also shows other messages received or sent by the Actuator, while interacting
with Etherware services and the actuator device.
This approach to application design has several advantages. First, the interactions be-
tween components can be formally speciﬁed as protocols in Maude. Second, the formal
speciﬁcation helps in analyzing and minimizing dependencies between components. Third,
the formal speciﬁcation can be used to verify and prove properties about component interac-
tions using the rich tool support in Maude [60]. Fourth, component behavior can be speciﬁed
and veriﬁed as a correct composition of relevant protocols. Finally, the above component
speciﬁcations can be composed into a formal speciﬁcation of the entire system, which can
then be used to study system level properties such as safety and liveness.
3.4.2 Etherware support
Maude speciﬁcations can be executed using the fairly powerful Maude execution environ-
ment. In particular, the environment supports a “loop mode” that allows other programs to
exchange data with executing Maude speciﬁcations. This functionality has been exploited
to support rapid prototyping of Maude component designs using Etherware. As shown in
Figure 3.12, an Etherware based Maude proxy service manages a Maude execution environ-
ment in an Etherware component, and exchanges messages between the Maude prototype
and the rest of Etherware. Interestingly, multiple instances of such components can also be
executed at the same time.
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3.5 Etherware capabilities
This section describes how the requirements listed in Section 2.3 are addressed by the design
principles and architecture of Etherware presented in this chapter.
3.5.1 Operational capabilities
The operational capabilities of Etherware are based on its programming model and services:
• Distributed operation: As described in Section 3.2, Etherware based components
communicate by exchanging messages using the same primitives regardless of whether
they execute on the same computer or on diﬀerent computers. In particular, the
problems of identifying and locating components are addressed by the ProﬁleRegistry
and NetworkMessenger services described in Section 3.3.
• Location independence: This is achieved in Etherware by assigning each compo-
nent a globally unique Binding, an addressing scheme that is independent of network
conventions and topologies. As explained in Section 3.3.4, each Binding is mapped
into a delivery address, which includes network speciﬁc details such as IP addresses.
In particular, even though the network part of a component’s delivery address changes
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when it is migrated from one computer to another, this is still transparent to other
components as these details are abstracted away in the programming model.
• Service description: This is supported by addressable components being able to
register ServiceProﬁles. A component that wishes to access a given service can just
address messages using an appropriate ServiceProﬁle. The Proﬁle is then matched
with registered Proﬁles by the ProﬁleRegistry. If a match is found, then the message
is directly forwarded to the appropriate component. If not, an appropriate exception
message is returned.
• Interface compatibility: This is primarily achieved by the use of XML documents
for communication between components, as described in Section 3.1. This helps solve
many integration problems that arise due to incompatible interfaces. Besides, compo-
nents use a simple and uniform functional interface for all interaction, as described in
Section 3.2.3.
• Semantics: Application semantics are usually speciﬁed and analyzed using formal
languages. As described in Section 3.4, the framework supports a protocol based
speciﬁcation of application design, and Etherware itself supports rapid prototyping by
allowing executable design speciﬁcations in Maude to be deployed in an operational
system.
• Distributed time: This issue is addressed by the automatic translation of message
time-stamps provided by the NetworkTimeService described in Section 3.3.7.
3.5.2 Non-functional capabilities
The following non-functional capabilities of Etherware are primarily due to its component
model and architecture:
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• Robustness: This is facilitated primarily by the check-pointing of component state
based on the Memento pattern. The eﬀect of component failures are contained by
eﬃcient check-point and restart mechanisms in Etherware as demonstrated in Section
4.3.1.
• Delay-reliability trade-oﬀ: MessageStreams support trading oﬀ reliability for lower
delays. They also provide a simple mechanism to incorporate support for other quality
of service requirements as necessary.
• Security: Security overrides can be easily implemented by adding Filters to compo-
nents and MessageStreams. Also, the order of Filters in a MessageStream essentially
determines their priority. In particular, later Filters have higher priority as they in-
tercept messages already ﬁltered by earlier Filters. For instance, a security override
Filter will be safety preserving if it has a lower priority than the safety Filter. These
and other issues are considered in detail in Chapter 6.
• Other requirements: The current algorithms for various services scale well for the
requirements in the testbed. In particular, they have been tested by operating up
to eight cars at a time, which represents the scenario with the maximum load in the
system. However, better algorithms can be easily incorporated if necessary.
3.5.3 Management capabilities
Provisions for conﬁguration management and check-pointing in Etherware support the fol-
lowing management capabilities:
• Startup: Start-up conﬁgurations and dependencies are speciﬁed to Etherware using
a simple conﬁguration ﬁle for each computer. Etherware ensures that components are
initialized in the correct order. In the current version, this consists of specifying the
absolute order in which components need to be initialized on a given node. However,
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support for more complicated dependencies can be easily supported using a richer
dependency evaluation system.
• System evolution: System evolution through component update and migration is
supported by component state check-pointing. The application state is maintained
across both operations using Mementos, and in particular, MessageStreams are main-
tained across component updates. As noted in Section 3.2, MessageStreams and Filters
also provide an elegant mechanism for system evolution without having to change any
existing connections between components.
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Chapter 4
ETHERWARE MECHANISMS
In Chapter 3, the programming model and architecture of Etherware were described. How-
ever, this description only constitutes a static picture of the system. So, to further elaborate
this picture, and illustrate the operation of Etherware, the dynamics and mechanisms of
Etherware are presented in this chapter. In particular, the normal operation of Etherware is
outlined, the mechanisms for component management are presented, and the performance
of Etherware is compared to other middleware.
4.1 Etherware initialization
The constituents of Etherware have various inter-dependencies, which are highlighted during
the initialization process. Speciﬁcally, the following sequence of activities occurs during the
initialization of Etherware:
1. Kernel startup: When an Etherware process is started on a computer, the Kernel
and Scheduler are initially started. The Kernel then instantiates and initializes all
local components based on appropriate conﬁguration speciﬁcations as described in the
following steps.
2. ProﬁleRegistry startup: The ﬁrst service initialized by the Kernel is the ProﬁleReg-
istry. The Kernel instantiates either a local or a global ProﬁleRegistry component as
speciﬁed in the service conﬁguration. Also, there must be at least one global Proﬁl-
eRegistry in the network as noted in Section 3.3.6.
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The ProﬁleRegistry maintains a mapping from ServiceProﬁles and Bindings of com-
ponents to corresponding delivery addresses as described in Section 3.3.6. However,
since the NetworkMessenger has not yet been initialized, only the local part of delivery
addresses is known at this point. Consequently, only local ServiceProﬁles and Bindings
can be resolved to corresponding components, and hence, only local message delivery
is possible.
3. NetworkMessenger startup: This is the second service initialized by the Kernel. As
noted in Section 3.3.5, the NetworkMessenger is responsible for sending and receiving
messages on the network, and hence, it must have a network address, such as an
IP address, to receive messages. As part of its initialization, the NetworkMessenger
registers itself with the ProﬁleRegistry and speciﬁes the local network address at which
it can receive messages over the network.
On receiving a registration message from the NetworkMessenger, the ProﬁleRegistry
then performs the following actions:
• It completes the partial delivery addresses in its repository with this network
address.
• It sends a message to the NetworkMessenger to be broadcast on the local network.
This is received by other NetworkMessengers and delivered to corresponding Pro-
ﬁleRegistry components. In particular,
– A Global ProﬁleRegistry broadcasts an announcement message to the local
ProﬁleRegistries.
– A Local ProﬁleRegistry broadcasts a discovery message to the global Proﬁl-
eRegistry. This is responded by an announcement from a global ProﬁleReg-
istry, if one has been initialized.
• When a Local ProﬁleRegistry receives an announcement, it notes the address of
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the global ProﬁleRegistry, and sends back an update with all the Proﬁles that it
has registered.
Since the Global ProﬁleRegistry has information about all components in the net-
work, and the NetworkMessenger can send and receive messages over the network, all
messages can be properly delivered at this point.
4. Other services: The remaining services are initialized by the Kernel according to the
service conﬁguration. In particular, the NetworkTimeService discovers Bindings of all
its peers on the network by a specialized query to the ProﬁleRegistry. Of course, such
a query can be used by an application component to discover a set of peers as well.
5. Application components: Finally, the Kernel initializes application components
according to an application conﬁguration ﬁle, which speciﬁes the following for each
component:
• The Java class ﬁle corresponding to the component.
• The XML document for the initialization state (Memento).
• The total order for initializing components.
4.2 Message delivery
Components can address messages using Proﬁles such as ServiceProﬁles, Bindings, and Taps.
However, as noted in Section 3.3.4, these must be mapped to delivery addresses of the
corresponding recipients for the messages to be delivered in Etherware. Hence, the two issues
that need to be addressed for message delivery are mapping Proﬁles to delivery addresses
and delivering messages based on these addresses. These issues are now considered in detail.
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4.2.1 Message headers
Messages have headers that contain all the information related to message delivery. This
includes:
• Sender: Delivery address of the sender of the message.
• Receiver: Delivery address of the receiver of the message.
• Filters: Delivery addresses of Filters that need to process the message, as well as
those that have already done so.
A lot of this information is already available in the component Shell of the sender. In
particular, the Binding of the component, which is the local part of the sender’s delivery
address, is provided to the Shell during component initialization. Also, if the message is
part of a MessageStream, or even a response to a previous message, then the receiver’s
delivery address is cached in the Shell. Further, when Filters register with components
or MessageStreams, their delivery addresses are also available as part of the header of the
registration message. Consequently, all this information is automatically ﬁlled in the message
header by the sender’s Shell.
The remaining information in the message header, basically the receiver’s delivery address
and the network part of the sender’s delivery address, has to be resolved before message
delivery can be done. However, since this information is distributed among the various parts
of Etherware, they are discovered by the following defaulting mechanisms:
• ProﬁleRegistry: This is the default recipient of all messages whose receiver’s delivery
address is not known.
• NetworkMessenger: This is the default recipient of all messages whose next re-
ceiver’s delivery addresses have non-local network parts.
The following important points must also be noted:
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• Messages are only delivered if the ﬁnal receiver’s address can be determined by the Pro-
ﬁleRegistry. In particular, if this cannot be determined, then an appropriate exception
message is sent back to the message sender.
• Messages are delivered to actual message receiver only after they have been through
all the Filters in the message header. Hence, the next receiver of a message is not
necessarily its ﬁnal receiver.
4.2.2 Delivery mechanism
The following steps constitute the actual message delivery mechanism in Etherware:
1. A component sends a message addressed with a Proﬁle such as a ServiceProﬁle, Bind-
ing, or Tap.
2. The sender’s Shell ﬁlls the message header with the local part of the sender’s delivery
address, as well as the delivery addresses of all the Filters for the message. It also ﬁlls
in the receiver’s delivery address if it is known.
3. The sender’s Shell sends the message to the Kernel for delivery.
4. The Kernel encounters one of the following three cases while delivering a message:
• If the receiver’s address is known, and the next receiver is a component managed
by the Kernel, then the message is delivered to this component’s Shell.
• If the receiver’s address is known, but the network part of the next receiver’s
address is not local, then the message is dispatched to the NetworkMessenger for
transmission over the network.
• If the receiver’s address is not known, then the message is sent to the ProﬁleReg-
istry for look-up.
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5. The NetworkMessenger transmits a remote message over the network. This is then
received by the corresponding NetworkMessenger on the remote node, which in turn
forwards the message to its Kernel for delivery. Of course, since the NetworkTimeSer-
vice (NTS) is added as a ﬁlter to each of the NetworkMessengers, the time-stamp of
the message is translated correctly as described in Section 3.3.7.
6. The ProﬁleRegistry looks up the receiver’s addresses based on the receiver’s Proﬁle in
the message. If a Proﬁle matching the message receiver’s Proﬁle has been registered,
then the corresponding delivery address is ﬁlled into the message header, and the
message is forwarded to the Kernel for delivery.
However, if no matching Proﬁle has been registered, then one of the following occurs:
• A local ProﬁleRegistry forwards the message to the global ProﬁleRegistry for
further look-up. However, if a global ProﬁleRegistry has not yet been initialized,
then an exception message is sent back to the sender.
• A global ProﬁleRegistry sends back an exception message to the sender.
7. The message is received by the next receiver’s Shell, which then removes the header
and forwards it to the component. In particular, if the component is only a Filter
and not the ﬁnal receiver of the message, then the message header is stored and later
appended when the message has been ﬁltered.
4.3 System evolution
Etherware has fairly eﬃcient mechanisms to support system robustness and evolution. In
particular, the mechanisms for component restarts, upgrades, and migration have been ana-
lyzed through detailed experiments in the testbed. We now describe these mechanisms and
their validating experiments in this section.
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Figure 4.1: Experimental setup
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Figure 4.2: Error in car trajectory due to controller restarts
The modiﬁed architecture of the testbed for the experiments is shown in Figure 4.1(a).
The components in this implementation have the same functionality as their in counterparts
in the exploratory implementation of Figure 2.2. The only addition was an Observer compo-
nent used to track the car positions as shown in Figure 4.1(a). As explained in Section 2.2,
the Controller and Actuator were executed on the same computer, while all other compo-
nents were executed on diﬀerent computers. Also, in all experiments, the goal was to make
the car traverse an oval trajectory as shown in Figure 4.1(b).
4.3.1 Component restart
The goal of this experiment was to analyze Etherware mechanisms for robustness. In particu-
lar, the ability to restart a faulty component was studied. To accomplish this, the Controller
component was forced to be restarted several times as the car was being driven along the
trajectory shown in Figure 4.1(b). Faults were injected at random by performing an illegal
operation (divide by zero) in the Controller. Such a fault caused the Controller to raise an
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exception and be restarted by Etherware.
The deviation of the actual car trajectory from the desired trajectory, as a function of
time, is shown in Figure 4.2. Restarts are indicated by pointers, and the accompanying
numbers indicate, in milliseconds, the time for each restart. These are times-tamps at
the Observer and include communication and synchronization times between the restarted
Controller and the Observer.
For the ﬁrst 60 seconds, the car operated without restarts and tracked the trajectory
with an error of less than 50mm. The ﬁrst restart occurred at about 70 seconds into the
experiment, and was followed by two other restarts in the next 20 seconds. The last three
faults were also handled by the restart mechanisms in Etherware. The plot in Figure 4.2
indicates that the error in the car position during these restarts was well within the system
error bounds during normal operation.
Two Etherware mechanisms contributed to the quick recoveries. First, the Shell inter-
cepted exceptions thrown due to Controller faults, and maintained the MessageStreams to
the other components across the restarts. Second, before termination, the Controller state
was check-pointed according to the Memento pattern, and this check-pointed state was then
used for proper re-initialization.
To illustrate the eﬀectiveness of these two mechanisms, the Etherware process managing
the Controller was restarted at about 100 seconds after the start of the experiment. As shown
in Figure 4.2, the subsequent restart of the Etherware process with the Controller took about
three seconds. During this time, the actual car trajectory accumulated a large error of about
0.8 meters with respect to the desired trajectory. This clearly illustrates the necessity for
eﬃcient restarts. Furthermore, even though the Controller restarted after three seconds,
additional error was accumulated before recovery. This was so because the Controller had
to reconnect to the other components, rebuild the state of the car, and bring it back on
track. This demonstrates the improvement that has been achieved by the check-pointing
mechanism in Etherware.
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Figure 4.3: Error in car trajectory due to controller upgrade
4.3.2 Component upgrade
This experiment was used to study the mechanisms in Etherware for upgrading components
dynamically. To test this, the car was initially controlled by a coarse Controller that operated
myopically. Etherware was then commanded, at about 90 seconds after the start, to upgrade
the coarse Controller to a better model predictive Controller. The plot of Figure 4.3 clearly
shows the improvement in the car operation after update. As shown in the ﬁgure, the
involved transients are well within the system error bounds.
This functionality is due to three key Etherware mechanisms. First, the Strategy pattern
allows one Controller to be replaced by another without any changes to the rest of the system.
Second, the Shell is able to upgrade the Controller without aﬀecting the MessageStreams to
other components. Finally, the Memento pattern allows the coarse Controller to check-point
its state before termination. This is then used to initialize the new Controller. The ﬁrst
mechanism allows for simple upgrades, while the other two mechanisms minimize the impact
of the upgrade on other components as well as the operation of the car.
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Figure 4.4: Error in car trajectory due to controller migration
4.3.3 Component migration
Etherware support for component migration was analyzed in this experiment. As before,
the error in the car trajectory is shown in Figure 4.4. The large spike at the beginning of the
graph was the transient error due to the car trying to catch up with its trajectory initially.
This is achieved at about 10 seconds into the experiment, after which the car follows the
trajectory within an error of 50mm. As shown in the Figure, the Controller was migrated
from one computer to another at about 45 seconds into the experiment. Clearly the error
introduced due to migration is well within the operational error of the car.
Two Etherware mechanisms enable migration. First, the Memento pattern allows the
current state of the Controller to be captured upon its termination. Second, the primitives
in the Kernel on the remote computer allow a new controller to be started there with the
check-pointed state of the old Controller.
These experiments demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of Etherware mechanisms that support
robustness and software evolution in networked control systems.
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4.4 Etherware performance
A comparison [58] of Etherware with other middleware for real-time and networked control
systems is presented in this section. In particular, the performance of Etherware is compared
with two widely available implementations of CORBA: ROFES 0.3b [61] and JacORB 2.0
[62]. ROFES supports the Minimum CORBA [32] and part of the Real-Time CORBA
1.1 [63] speciﬁcations, while JacORB supports the CORBA 3.0 speciﬁcation.
For the comparison experiments, the Control Time Protocol (CTP) described in Section
3.3.7 was implemented in all three middleware, and a reference implementation in Java using
sockets was used as the baseline. The conﬁguration was basically a client pinging a remote
server at a frequency of 10 Hz. The time line for this was as shown in Figure 3.9. The
client periodically sent pings to the server, which responded with a time-stamp tp. Each
ping packet and its response had about 1500 bytes of “payload” data to simulate actual
packets in the system. At run time, only time stamps were collected and recorded in log
ﬁles, while the CTP estimation algorithm was run oﬀ-line on the accumulated log ﬁles.
Hence, the delays in the experiments were mainly due to overhead of the middleware and
their communication protocols.
Three scenarios were considered for connecting the client and server: a wired network, an
ad hoc wireless network (single hop), and a wireless network in base-station mode (two hops)
- a fairly standard conﬁguration for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. The wired network was
a 10 Mbps Ethernet, the IEEE 802.11 wireless networks used Cisco Aironet 350 series cards,
and the base station was an ORiNOCO AP-1000 access point. All code was executed on
Pentium III machines with Red Hat Linux 9.0 as the operating system. The wired networks
were isolated LANs, but each wireless network scenario had cross traﬃc from the other
scenario, neighboring labs, and the campus network.
The distribution of round trip times for pings in the three cases are shown in Figures
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, and the corresponding statistics are tabulated in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of round trip times for Ethernet
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of round trip times for one-hop wireless network
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of round trip times for two-hop wireless network (base-station mode)
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Min Mean Std Dev Median
Java 0 0.2258 1.1026 0
JacORB 1 2.6532 2.1488 2
ROFES 0 5.3765 4332 3
Etherware 14 17.4990 1.3575 18
Table 4.1: Round trip time statistics for wired link
Min Mean Std Dev Median
Java 1 13.1169 12.9551 8
JacORB 16 29.6037 9.3428 28
ROFES 16 38.7757 11.9378 38
Etherware 17 28.9885 11.0453 25
Table 4.2: Round trip time statistics for wireless link (one hop)
respectively. Since the delays are fairly small in the Ethernet case, Figure 4.5 and Table
4.1 essentially illustrate the overhead in the implementations of the various middleware. In
particular, the relatively high mean delay for Etherware is mainly due to the overhead of the
XML implementation in Java. Consequently, the remaining comparisons clearly favor the
CORBA implementations. Interestingly, however, in the one-hop wireless link case shown in
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.2, we see that the three implementations have comparable minimum
delays, while Etherware has the lowest mean delay. This is further accentuated in the base-
station case of Table 4.3.
The impact of these statistics on the estimation algorithms of CTP is also interesting.
In particular, the long term behavior of the estimate error err = tp − test can be studied by
considering its exponentially weighted moving average e of err, which is computed iteratively
as follows:
Min Mean Std Dev Median
Java 2 26.5024 23.9759 18
JacORB 14 45.8100 25.2337 36
ROFES 14 50.1266 23.7878 44
Etherware 18 39.8066 17.7430 35
Table 4.3: Round trip time statistics for Base station mode (two hop)
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of mean error for the three scenarios
et =
√
λe2t−1 + (1− λ)err2t
Since the error err = tp−test could be positive or negative, the squared error err2t at time
t is used in the above equation. Also, et is the average up to time t. In addition, it must be
noted that the CTP implementation assumed symmetric delays, which implies d1 = d2 = d
in Figure 3.9.
The plots with λ = 0.9995 are shown in Figure 4.8. The ﬁrst plot shows the performance
of the estimator in the wired network case. In the steady state, the errors are similar and
quite small (less than 3 ms). The primary cause for error in this plot is jitter. However, the
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error is bounded by round-trip time. Thus, we see that the small jitter in Etherware allows
it to have a tight error bound despite a larger average round-trip time. The initial transient
seen in the Etherware plot is due to startup contentions. The second and third plots show
performance comparisons for the one-hop and two hop wireless cases, respectively. We see
that performance degrades in all cases, but the degradation of Etherware is lesser than that
of the CORBA implementations.
The principal reason for the relatively better performance of Etherware in these exper-
iments is the additional option of using UDP based communication to trade-oﬀ reliability
for lower delays. In particular, this option is not available in the other middleware as the
CORBA speciﬁcation speciﬁcally mandates the use of TCP due to RPC based communi-
cation semantics. As discussed in Section 3.1, and demonstrated in these experiments, the
ability to trade-oﬀ reliability for lower delays is very important for networked control appli-
cations. It must be noted, however, that option does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect single processor
systems and wired networks as seen in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.1, and more importantly, as
established by the success of Real-Time CORBA for various control applications [22].
The main point is that networked control applications need the ability to trade-oﬀ reli-
ability for lower delay in communication over networks, and the Etherware support for this
trade-oﬀ is crucial for such applications.
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Chapter 5
ETHERWARE BASED
APPLICATION DESIGN
Etherware is a message oriented component middleware for networked control systems. The
primitives in the Etherware programming model have been designed speciﬁcally for con-
trol applications, and its architectural trade-oﬀs have been engineered for such systems.
Consequently, systems such as the traﬃc control testbed described in Section 2.1 can be
architected and implemented using Etherware in a straightforward fashion. To emphasize
this, and illustrate application development using the associated middleware framework, an
Etherware based design and re-implementation of the traﬃc control testbed is presented in
this chapter.
Etherware has been designed as domainware for networked control. Several forcing func-
tions of this domain have been exploited in its design as described in Section 3.1. However,
application design is still constrained by these forcing functions, and in particular, Ether-
ware based applications must have properties such as fault tolerance and local temporal
autonomy for eﬀective operation. In practice, these constraints can usually be addressed by
using appropriate design patterns for control applications. In this chapter, we describe two
such design patterns - state estimation and receding horizon control - that have been used
in the Etherware based implementation of the traﬃc control testbed [64]. We also present
a detailed analysis of the real-time performance of their implementation, and validate this
with an experimental case study in the testbed [65].
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Figure 5.1: Software architecture of the Etherware based testbed implementation
5.1 Testbed redesign
The ﬁrst implementation of the traﬃc control testbed, described in Section 2.2, was based
on operating system level primitives such as processes, threads, and sockets [54]. This
endeavor served as a testing ground for trying out various programming models, and choosing
primitives that were most suitable for such systems. In particular, the various components
and sub-systems had to be designed from scratch, and their interactions had to be carefully
engineered for the desired performance. Hence, this served as the basis for the development
of both Etherware itself, as well as an Etherware based implementation of the testbed.
The software architecture of the redesigned testbed is shown in Figure 5.1. Since the
various entities in the exploratory implementation of Figure 2.2 had well-deﬁned function-
alities and interfaces, they were directly implemented as Etherware components. Although
the image processing algorithm and the actuation interface were still implemented in C++
for library support, they were also encapsulated in Etherware based components for system
integration. In addition, all the components were implemented passively, and the notiﬁcation
service described in Section 3.3.2 was used for periodic activation.
The data streams from the VisionSensors to the VisionServer were implemented as Mes-
sageStreams as shown in Figure 5.1. In particular, this allowed the ability to trade-oﬀ reli-
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ability for low-delay. Similarly, the control streams from the Supervisor to the Controllers
were also implemented as MessageStreams. Further, the interactions between the Controller
and the Actuator were implemented as two diﬀerent MessageStreams: a control stream from
the Controller to the Actuator, and a feedback stream conversely. Finally, the feedback
stream from the VisionSensor to the Supervisor and the Controllers was implemented as a
MulticastStream.
The above description illustrates how the design of the testbed was directly implemented
using the primitives of the Etherware programming model presented in Section 3.2. In
addition, this design can also be evolved quite naturally using MessageFilters and component
Proﬁles as demonstrated in Chapter 6.
5.2 Robustness in control systems
The ability to tolerate faults is the basis for safe and reliable operation of control systems,
and robustness is the basic system property that ensures this. In general, system faults
are application speciﬁc, and the corresponding design considerations for robustness have to
be suitably tailored. However, many of these faults are common to most applications, and
the corresponding solutions can be reused eﬀectively. In this chapter, we address two such
common kinds of faults: communication faults and software failures, and begin with a brief
overview of related work in this section.
Communication faults primarily manifest as delays and losses of messages between soft-
ware components. Consequently, the problem of tolerating delays and errors, particularly
in sensory feedback, has been addressed quite extensively. For instance, Kalman Filters [6]
are widely used as state estimators to overcome noisy feedback. In addition, the eﬀect of
delays on the operation and stability of a controller has been studied [66], and the use of
a state estimator to stabilize controllers in the presence of random delays has also been
analyzed [67].
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Software failures, on the other hand, can have a variety of symptoms and eﬀects - from er-
roneous software computations to component failures. Simplex [68] is a popular architecture
that uses analytical redundancy to provide robustness against such failures in controllers.
In Simplex, two controllers are employed: a simple robust controller, and a complex and
possibly defective controller. The complex controller usually has better performance and
operates the system most of the time. However, a supervisor constantly monitors the state
of the system and can quickly switch to the simple controller if the system approaches in-
stability. This is a simple and uniform approach to address software failures in the complex
controller. However, Simplex may not always be applicable as some control systems may
not have such a back-up controller. Also, Simplex does not address communication faults,
and the problem of replica determinism in real-time systems is quite challenging [69].
Traditional fault-tolerance mechanisms in distributed control systems have relied primar-
ily on redundancy and replication of components [70] [71]. While replication is an eﬀective
technique against hardware failures and transient errors, it is usually quite resource inten-
sive, and in particular, does not address software errors that would cause all replicas to fail
on identical inputs [72]. Proactive recovery [73] is another technique used to pro-actively
prevent errors such as failures due to resource exhaustion. However, it is diﬃcult to predict
such errors related to transients or software bugs. Consequently, restart based recovery may
perhaps be the only viable solution in such instances. Indeed, popular techniques such as
software rejuvenation [74] and recovery-oriented computing [75] [76] are based on restarts of
individual components for system recovery.
The importance of low-cost fault-tolerance techniques without the use of redundant con-
trollers has been considered before [77] [78]. However, fault tolerance in distributed control
systems needs to be addressed at a system-wide level instead of just at the level of an in-
dividual controller [79] . In the following, we adopt this approach to fault-tolerance, where
we guarantee correct system operation, even in the presence of communication delays and
restarts of individual components.
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Figure 5.2: A simple control loop
5.3 Design patterns for robustness
Control systems are characterized by components operating in control loops. In networked
control systems, such loops may involve communication over network links as well. For
instance, a simple control loop is shown in Figure 5.2, where feedback from the sensor to
the controller and controls from the controller to the actuator are transmitted over network
channels.
Networked control loops involve many failures that need to be tolerated for eﬀective op-
eration. For instance, communication channels in best eﬀort networks, and particularly in
wireless networks, are prone to delays and packet losses. Also, the failure of a remote compo-
nent, such as the controller in the above example, could potentially disrupt the operation of
the entire system. Even in the presence of eﬃcient fault tolerance and restart mechanisms,
the involved transients could still lead to system instabilities.
Local temporal autonomy is a key property that can be used to address most of the above
problems. It is the ability of components to tolerate disruptions in other components for a
certain amount of time, and with graceful degradation. This not only shields components
from the faults listed above, but also provides precious additional time to recover from such
faults as well. In this section, we present two design patterns that use this property to
address faults in each of the communication links in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.3: State estimation design pattern
5.3.1 State estimation
Sensory feedback from the sensor to the controller is the basis of feedback control. In digital
control design, such feedback is expected to be periodic with hard real-time guarantees.
However, such guarantees cannot be provided over best eﬀort and wireless network channels.
Hence, to apply digital control theory in the design of networked control systems, this
problem has to be addressed eﬀectively.
State estimation [59] is a widely used technique in control systems to overcome noise
in sensory feedback. For this, a state estimator maintains a model of the plant, which it
then uses to predict plant behavior based on received feedback and applied controls. Due
to modeling errors, the error in state estimates grow with time. However, regular feedback
improves these estimates and keeps the error bounded. In particular, the state estimator can
take in feedback with delays and jitter, and still provide reasonably accurate and periodic
state estimates.
The essence of the state estimation design pattern is to use a state estimator at the
controller to tolerate faults in sensory feedback as shown in Figure 5.3. Since the state
estimator can provide reasonably accurate estimates without feedback for a limited duration,
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Figure 5.4: Receding horizon control design pattern
this pattern increases the local temporal autonomy of the controller. In addition, the state
estimator also provides periodic estimates to the controller enabling the application of digital
control theory in networked control systems.
5.3.2 Receding horizon control
Traditional digital controllers operate periodically, computing one set of controls for every
period. These controls are then sent to the actuator, which eﬀects them in the plant. This
simple design works well in practice when the controller and the actuator execute on the same
computer. However, when they communicate over a network link, then the above design is
vulnerable to the attendant faults of networked operation. In particular, when periodic
controls do not arrive from the controller due to software or communication failures, then
the actuator has no controls to eﬀect. In such cases, actuators may have default fail-safe
controls that maintain system safety. While this approach may work with occasional failures,
it is certainly quite sub-optimal in most networked control systems.
Under the receding horizon control design pattern, the controller computes a sequence
of future controls during every period. These controls are then stored in a control buﬀer
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Figure 5.5: Design enhancements in the lower level control loop of the testbed
at the actuator as shown in Figure 5.4(b). Hence, if a subsequent control update from the
controller is delayed or lost, then the actuator can use the pre-computed controls from the
control buﬀer. Consequently, this improves the local temporal autonomy of the actuator,
and promotes graceful degradation in the presence of controller failures.
Two important points regarding receding horizon control must be noted. First, the
controller needs a model to estimate future plant behavior so that it can compute a sequence
of controls. One interesting option is to use the state estimator itself as a state predictor
since the estimator already has a model of the plant. Alternatively, control laws such as
model predictive control [27], which automatically compute sequences of future controls,
may also be employed. Second, since the actual controls eﬀected by the actuator are not
known in advance, this information must be fed back to the controller and its state estimator
as shown in Figure 5.4(b).
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5.3.3 Testbed design enhancements
The state estimation and receding horizon control design patterns have been applied in both
the control loops of the testbed shown in Figure 5.1. In particular, the design enhancements
to the lower level control loop are shown in Figure 5.5. The enhanced Controller uses a
state estimator to ﬁlter the sensory feedback from the VisionServer. Also, the Controller
computes and sends a sequence of future controls to the Actuator, which then stores them in
a control buﬀer according to the receding horizon control design pattern. The Controller in
the testbed uses model predictive control [27] as noted in Section 2.2. Hence, it automatically
computes a sequence of future controls that are then sent to the Actuator. In particular,
the state estimator and the Controller use the same plant model.
In the rest of the chapter, we analyze and experimentally validate the above design
enhancements in the lower level control loop of the testbed.
5.4 Analysis of testbed enhancements
The design enhancements to the lower level control loop in the testbed, shown in Figure 5.5,
improve system robustness by increasing the local temporal autonomy of components. In
eﬀect, the deadlines for sensory feedback and control updates are extended, and the overall
system has graceful degradation in the presence of communication and software failures. We
now analyze these deadline extensions, and in particular, characterize the worst-case and
average-case degradation in system performance during failures.
The following factors determine the extension of deadlines for the controller in the en-
hanced control loop:
1. System tolerance and operational error bounds for the plant.
2. Growth of error in plant state predictions.
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Figure 5.6: State evolution in the car model
3. Computational resources available at the controller to compute sequences of future
controls during each period.
4. Size of the control buﬀer at the actuator to store the future controls.
5. Communication bandwidth between the controller and the actuator to send a sequence
of future controls during each period.
The last three factors depend on system deployment constraints and can be engineered
as necessary. However, the growth of prediction error is determined by the plant model, and
the future control horizon is essentially the interval up to which this error is within system
tolerance. Consequently, in the rest of the chapter, we focus primarily on the second factor,
and analyze how deadlines have been extended in the testbed due to this. Finally, since both
state estimation and receding horizon control use the same plant model in the testbed, we
note that the following analysis applies to deadline extensions for sensory feedback as well.
5.4.1 Car Model
In the traﬃc control testbed, we model a car by considering its position and orientation on
the track. More speciﬁcally, the state of a car xt at time t is given by xt = [xt yt θt]
T , where
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xt and yt are the coordinates of the center of the car, and θt is its orientation. Further, the
car has a speed st and steering αt at time t.
The evolution of car state xt in one time step is shown in Figure 5.6. The orientation of
the car after one time step is given by
θt+1 = θt + h ∗ αt + wθt
where h is the length of a time-step, and wθt is the update error due to noise. During this
interval, the car is moving at speed st. Further, we assume that h is small enough so that the
car moves at an average orientation of ϑt = θt + (αt/2) during the interval. Consequently,
the car has a displacement of h ∗ st at an orientation of ϑt. These relations are summarized
in the following equation.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
xt+1
yt+1
θt+1
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 hst cosϑt
0 1 0 hst sin ϑt
0 0 1 hαt
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
xt
yt
θt
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
wxt
wyt
wθt
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(5.1)
Equation (5.1) can be written more compactly using vectors as follows:
xt+1 = Mtxt +wt (5.2)
where xt is the state of the car, Mt is the car model, and wt is the update error, all at time
t. Also, the state has been extended to xt = [xt yt θt 1]
T to account for state evolution.
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5.4.2 Worst-case error bound
During normal operation, the state estimator maintains xˆt, an estimate of the state xt,
which evolves according to the equations
xˆ
(−)
t+1 = Mtxˆt (5.3)
xˆt+1 = f(xˆ
(−)
t+1,yt+1) (5.4)
where yt+1 is the observation (sensor feedback) at time t + 1 and is used to correct the
estimate using the correction f in (5.4). This is a common approach to account for the error
term wt in (5.2) [80].
During state prediction, however, there are no observations, and xˆt evolves according to
xˆt+1 = Mtxˆt (5.5)
Since the error term wt in (5.2) cannot be accounted for in the prediction update of (5.5),
the prediction error x˜t = xt − xˆt grows with time. In particular, if x˜0 = 0, and the error
term can be bounded as wt ≤ wmax, then the prediction error grows as
x˜t+1 ≤ wmaxt (5.6)
due to the special structures of Mt (upper triangular form) and wt (last component is zero)
shown in (5.1). This is equivalent to specifying uncertainty in the prediction of the car
position by a bounding box whose area grows linearly with time. Consequently, if the
acceptable uncertainty is x˜max, then the prediction is acceptable for all time t with
x˜t+1 ≤ wmaxt ≤ x˜max (5.7)
Hence, the deterministic (worst case) upper bound on the prediction error grows linearly
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with time. Further, since prediction is equivalent to estimation without observations, the
same analysis applies for computing deadlines for the sensor as well. In particular, the
maximum value of t satisfying (5.7) is the hard real-time deadline for sensory feedback.
5.4.3 Mean error bound
The deterministic analysis of Section 5.4.2 can be used to compute hard-real time deadlines
using (5.7). In particular, this bound uses the maximum error w˜max, and hence the prediction
error bound grows linearly with time. However, if the error w˜t is “well behaved”, and we
can tolerate occasional failures, then we can obtain signiﬁcantly higher deadline extensions.
In equation (5.2), the exact values of wt cannot usually be determined in practice, and
only the probability distributions are known. Hence, xt and wt are modeled as random
variables in the car model as well as in the updates of (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5). Further, we
may reasonably assume that the error terms wt are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) with mean zero. We can then use (5.2) and (5.5) to compute the mean squared error
as follows:
E[x˜Tt+1x˜t+1] = E[(x˜
T
t M
T
t +w
T
t )(Mtx˜t +wt)]
= E[x˜Tt M
T
t Mtx˜t] + E[w
T
t wt] + E[x˜
T
t M
T
t ]E[wt] + E[w
T
t ]E[Mtx˜t]
= E[x˜Tt M
T
t Mtx˜t] + E[w
T
t wt] (5.8)
The expectations factor out in the ﬁrst step since x˜t is independent of wt, and the last
two terms disappear in the second step as wt has mean zero.
Equation (5.8) is a recursion in x˜t. Assuming x˜0 = 0, we can solve the above recursion
to get x˜t+1 in terms of the error terms wj as
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E[x˜Tt+1x˜t+1] = E[w
T
t wt] +
t−1∑
j=1
E[w˜Tj (
t∏
i=j+1
MTi )(
t−(j+1)∏
i=0
Mt−i)w˜j ] (5.9)
Due to the special structures of Mt (upper triangular form) and wt (last component is
zero) shown in (5.1), each term in the above summation reduces to E[wTj wj]. Further, since
the wj were assumed to be i.i.d, we have E[w
Tw] = E[wTj wj ] for all j. Consequently, (5.9)
simpliﬁes to give
E[x˜Tt+1x˜t+1] = E[w
Tw] ∗ t (5.10)
We can now conclude that the mean prediction error  grows as the square root of time
t, i.e.,
 =
√
E[x˜Tt+1x˜t+1] = k
√
t (5.11)
for constant k. In practice, this gives much higher deadline extensions than (5.6) as we
demonstrate in Section 5.5.
The key result in this section is summarized in the theorem below.
Theorem 5.4.1 For the car model given by (5.2), the worst-care error grows linearly with
time. Further, if error terms wt are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with mean
zero, then the mean error grows as the square root of time.
Hence, to operate the system with the hard guarantee that a car will stay within the
system tolerance, the deadline is the largest t for which (5.7) is satisﬁed. However, if occa-
sional failures can be tolerated, then using (5.11) gives much larger deadline extensions in
practice.
5.5 Experimental validation
This section presents a case-study to validate the conclusions of Section 5.4.
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5.5.1 Case study: Motorcade
Through our experiments we intend to answer the following questions:
1. Does the empirical growth in state prediction error correspond to (5.11) in Section 5.4?
2. What is the deadline extension achieved?
3. Is our new design indeed tolerant to delayed restarts of sensors and controllers?
To answer these questions, we consider a motorcade scenario with two cars: a leader and
a follower. The cars move around in an elliptical trajectory with a major axis of length 2.8m
and a minor axis of length 2m. The cars themselves are about 225mm long, travel at an
average speed of 371mm/s, and take about 21.7 seconds for one iteration of the trajectory.
An elliptical trajectory was chosen since it exercises diﬀerent steering angles at diﬀerent
points.
The main goal is to maintain a separation of about 400mm between the centers of the
cars, i.e., about 175mm between their bumpers. Hence, the deviation of the leader car from
its trajectory is constrained to be less than half the separation between the cars in order to
avoid collision. To ensure this, we set the maximum allowable deviation for the leader car
to be 50mm.
Error in state prediction
In the ﬁrst experiment, we seek to answer the ﬁrst two questions posed in Section 5.5.1 by
measuring the growth of error in state prediction as a function of time. For this, the leading
car is driven along the elliptical trajectory, and a separate state estimator for the car is
executed in parallel. At a designated point, the feedback to the state estimator is turned
oﬀ, after which the estimator essentially operates as a state predictor. However, the actual
car is still operated by a controller with complete feedback. Hence, the distance between the
actual position of the car and the predictions of the state estimator is the growth of error
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in state prediction. Figure 5.7 plots the prediction error for six diﬀerent points along the
elliptical trajectory of the motorcade.
As shown in Figure 5.7, the prediction error grows as the square root of time. In fact,
the ﬁgure also shows the solid curve y = k
√
x, where k = 1.0769 is the value for which
this function has the least mean squared error from the prediction error curves. This is in
accordance with the average case analysis of Section 5.4.3 and validates (5.11). Also, the
maximum diﬀerence between calibrated speeds is 127mm/s. Assuming this to be the worst
case error in (5.7) for the duration of two seconds, Figure 5.7 also shows the growth of the
worse case error bound with time.
To determine the deadline extensions, we observe when the various error curves hit the
tolerable error bound of 50mm in Figure 5.7. The original deadline for the sensor and the
controller was 100ms - the operating period of the lower level control loop. However, the
design enhancements presented in this chapter extend even the worst case deadline to 400ms.
If occasional failures can be tolerated, then the average error curves show that this deadline
can be further extended to 1300ms. In particular, these extended deadlines are more than
suﬃcient to tolerate most delays in the network.
Eﬀect of delayed restarts
The second experiment addresses the third question raised in Section 5.5.1. In this exper-
iment, both cars in the motorcade have trajectories that make them go along an ellipse
with a separation of about 400mm between their centers. Faults are then injected into the
controller (cf. Figure 5.5) of the leader at random points in the trajectory. The subsequent
restart of the controller is also delayed for random intervals to observe the behavior of the
car based on future controls stored in the control buﬀer at the actuator. Note that restarting
the vision sensor would have a similar eﬀect on the behavior of the car, since in either case
the controls are being computed by using the same plant model.
The distance between the leader and the follower is shown in Figure 5.8, and the cor-
90
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
x 
10
4
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
42
0
10
02
15
23
62
1
22
0
20
44
50
1
12
92
tim
e 
(m
illis
ec
on
ds
)
Distance between cars (mm)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
ca
rs
(m
m)
Ti
m
e 
of
 c
on
tro
lle
r f
ai
lu
re
Ti
m
e 
of
 c
on
tro
lle
r r
es
ta
rt
El
ap
se
d 
tim
e 
to
 re
co
ve
r (
ms
)
F
ig
u
re
5.
8:
D
is
ta
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
ce
n
te
rs
of
ca
rs
in
th
e
m
ot
or
ca
d
e
91
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
x 
10
4
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
42
0
10
02
15
23
62
1
22
0
20
44
50
1
12
92
tim
e 
(m
illis
ec
on
ds
)
Deviation from trajectory (mm)
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 tr
aje
cto
ry 
(m
m)
Ti
m
e 
of
 c
on
tro
lle
r f
ai
lu
re
Ti
m
e 
of
 c
on
tro
lle
r r
es
ta
rt
El
ap
se
d 
tim
e 
to
 re
co
ve
r (
ms
)
F
ig
u
re
5.
9:
D
ev
ia
ti
on
of
le
ad
er
fr
om
it
s
tr
a
je
ct
or
y
92
responding deviation of the leader from its trajectory is plotted in Figure 5.9. The initial
increase in the distance between the two cars is due to the cars catching up with their tra-
jectories during start-up. This transient is resolved in about 10s, and the cars stay quite
close to their trajectories for the rest of the experiment.
The eﬀect of restarting the controller of the leading car is clearly reﬂected in both ﬁgures.
In particular, for restart delays of less than 1.3 seconds, the distance between the cars does
not vary by more than 50mm. This is consistent with the behavior observed in Figure
5.7. However, when the restarts are delayed for longer intervals, we see that the distance
reduces as the follower comes closer to the leader. In particular, for the two second restart
at about 100s into the experiment, the future controls in the control buﬀer of the actuator
are exhausted and the car stops. Consequently, we see that the cars collide as expected.
We conclude that the experimental results are in conformity with the conclusions of
Section 5.4, and more importantly, the design patterns presented in this chapter eﬀectively
address the forcing functions of the networked control domain.
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Chapter 6
SAFETY AND SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS
Control systems interact with the real world, and hence, safety is a central concern in their de-
sign and operation. Indeed, safety considerations inﬂuence many of the engineering decisions
and trade-oﬀs in systems design. For instance, multimedia applications are typically exe-
cuted as soft real-time tasks, while mission critical systems generally require hard-real time
guarantees and over-provisioned or dedicated resources. Also, appropriate safety measures
can usually be incorporated at diﬀerent levels in application design as well. For example, in
the traﬃc control testbed of Figure 5.1, a default fail-safe control such as a stop command
is an eﬀective safety measure in the Actuator, while gridlock free scheduling of cars by the
Supervisor addresses system-wide safety concerns. In general, such safety features can and
ought to be incorporated into components and sub-systems as an integral part of control
system design.
While mechanisms such as collision avoidance can be employed during normal operation,
it may not be useful, or even practical, to enforce some safety measures all the time. For
instance, if there are not too many cars in the traﬃc control testbed, then the probability
of gridlocks occurring is quite small. In this case, low overhead gridlock detection can be
used during normal operation, so that higher overhead resolution algorithms are employed
only when a gridlock is detected. Such an approach is quite valuable as necessary safety
can be enforced with low operating overhead and much better scalability. In this chapter,
we present an Etherware based Control System Incident Response (CSIR) framework that
allows such mechanisms to be implemented as Strategies for Incident Response (SIRs) in
control systems.
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Many security problems can also be addressed in a similar fashion; low overhead detec-
tion mechanisms can be used during normal operation, and more expensive responses can
be triggered only when a security failure is detected. However, care must be taken while
enforcing security responses in control systems as the associated override mechanisms must
respect underlying plant dynamics. In particular, some of the underlying safety measures
may still need to be preserved during security overrides.
We capture the above insight by introducing the principle of safety preserving security
overrides in the following, and establish the importance of this principle through a detailed
case-study in the testbed. In the process, we also describe safety and security mechanisms
in the testbed, and illustrate the ease with which these can be integrated into our Etherware
based testbed implementation.
6.1 Control System Incident Response
Complex control systems usually have imprecise models of their plants. Consequently, during
normal operation, such systems may occasionally get into states that violate the operational
constraints of control algorithms in the system. For instance, in a distributed traﬃc control
system, a small segment of the road network may become congested or blocked due to an
accident. Such situations are usually exceptional in that they are expected to occur quite
infrequently, but additional strategies would be required to bring the system back to normal
operation. Such an exceptional situation is called an incident, and an associated response
strategy is called a Strategy for Incident Response (SIR).
Control System Incident Response (CSIR) is a framework that allows strategies address-
ing incidents in control systems to be correctly and systematically incorporated into the
system architecture. In particular, the CSIR framework operates in conjunction with the
regular control system, and enables the addition of SIRs with minimal impact to the rest
of the system. For example, using a CSIR framework, an SIR to appropriately manage
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congested traﬃc could be added to respond to accidents in traﬃc control systems.
6.1.1 Rationale
A central concern in the CSIR based approach is the following: if incidents in control systems
can indeed be modeled, then why should SIRs not be part of the normal algorithms in
control systems. For instance, in a traﬃc control system, why wouldn’t managing traﬃc
around accidents be an active function of a high-level supervisor? To address this concern,
we provide the following justiﬁcations for CSIR:
• System tractability: Plants are usually modeled at diﬀerent levels of detail in diﬀerent
layers of a control hierarchy. This allows tractable control algorithms to be developed
in the higher control layers, rather than using detailed models in these layers, which
would make their design unnecessarily complex, or even intractable. However, most
incidents are usually detected in lower level detailed models, but require higher level
response. Hence, an SIR would have to be used to recover from such incidents.
We illustrate the above argument using the traﬃc control testbed in Figure 5.1. The
high-level traﬃc Supervisor models the traﬃc network at the granularity of roads, while
the low-level Controllers monitor actual states of their associated cars. This allows
tractable control algorithms to be developed to manage city traﬃc as well as to control
individual cars. However, the Supervisor cannot completely avoid congestion due to
accidents since it does not directly track or control individual cars. Also, a congested
region cannot be controlled using “normal” traﬃc rules, as controlling all the cars
through a high-level Supervisor would result in a very centralized system. In particular,
such a design is not desirable due to poor scalability and very high communication
overheads. Hence, an SIR would be necessary to address such a situation.
• Performance trade-oﬀ: Although control algorithms based on detailed models may be
tractable in some cases, the amount of information to be processed, and the detail
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of controls to be speciﬁed, could still require the system to be operated in a fairly
sub-optimal regime. This is usually not desirable as the cost of such performance
degradation is usually much greater than that associated with a CSIR framework.
For instance, in the traﬃc control testbed, it is possible for the Supervisor to track and
control individual cars if they moved very slowly. However, such poor performance is
not acceptable during normal operation. On the other hand, this could be the only
recourse in the case of an accident. Hence, it would be sensible to employ an SIR
involving detailed supervisory control only during accidents.
• Modeling limitations: Physical models of the actual plant under control, are imprecise.
Consequently, there is always the potential for incidents due to modeling inaccuracies.
Hence, a CSIR framework would be necessary even if the above considerations are
inapplicable to a system. Since it is impossible to predict or avoid all accidents in
traﬃc control systems, SIRs are therefore necessary to respond to such incidents.
• Goal changes: Some incidents can potentially change system objectives so that impor-
tant though temporary goals may emerge as a result. In such situations, while it may
be impractical to change the entire system to respond to such a transient goal, using
a CSIR framework would still allow an appropriate SIR to be employed. For example,
giving higher priority to an ambulance would be the most important goal after a traﬃc
accident. However, once the accident has been appropriately responded to, the system
can return to normal operation where all cars are scheduled with equal priority. A
CSIR framework would allow such an incident to be addressed using an appropriate
SIR.
6.1.2 Strategies for Incident Response
A Strategy for Incident Response (SIR) is the sequence of activities undertaken in response to
an incident in a control system. While the particular set of undertaken activities depends on
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speciﬁc incidents, the activities can still be categorized based on the underlying strategy. For
instance, in a Detect-Investigate-Respond (DIR) strategy, the following types of activities
are involved:
• Detection activities: These are used to monitor the plant state for symptoms of inci-
dents. Since these are continuously performed in the system, they usually have very
low impact and overhead. Typical detection activities include monitoring data ﬂows to
detect outliers, and operating special sensors to detect incidents. For instance, activ-
ities such as the detection of road obstructions and accidents directly through special
sensors, or indirectly through traﬃc congestion, belong in this category.
• Investigation activities: On detection of incidents, further investigative activities are
initiated. These typically involve an initial response, followed by further analysis of
the symptoms to suitably classify the incident and determine appropriate recovery
procedures. These are higher impact activities that might place the aﬀected part of
the system into a safety response mode. For instance, when a road gets congested, the
blocked cars have to be moved out of the road, and the road has to be temporarily
removed from the traﬃc grid. Concurrently, the cause of the congestion, which could
be a road block, an obstruction, or an accident, should also be investigated so that
appropriate recovery activities can be initiated.
• Recovery activities: Once an incident has been suitably classiﬁed, appropriate recovery
activities can then be employed to bring the system back to normal operation. These
are potentially very high impact activities that could aﬀect a larger part of the system.
For instance, once the cause of traﬃc congestion in a road has been identiﬁed, recovery
involves routing appropriate emergency response vehicles with high priority in the
system. Also, when the situation has been addressed suitably, normal scheduling of
traﬃc is resumed, and the repaired road is eventually added back to the traﬃc grid.
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In some cases, classiﬁcation of incidents may not require further investigation, and a
Detect-Respond (DR) strategy may be suﬃcient. Although many other strategies could
also be deployed in a CSIR framework, in this chapter, we focus mainly on DR and DIR
strategies.
6.1.3 Etherware mechanisms
The Etherware programming model described in Section 3.2 enables the design of fairly
complex safety mechanisms. In particular, the following primitives provide speciﬁc support
for the CSIR framework:
• MulticastStream: MulticastStreams are eﬃcient data distribution mechanisms. For in-
stance, the vision based feedback in the traﬃc control testbed is communicated through
a MulticastStream as shown in Figure 5.1. Detection mechanisms in a DIR strategy
can also be supported quite eﬃciently through such a feedback MulticastStream. In
particular, detection components can be easily added or removed at runtime without
the involvement of, or impact to, other operational components in the system.
• Filter: Filters intercept messages in MessageStreams. Hence, detection mechanisms
can be implemented as message Filters as well. In particular, they can be added or
removed dynamically in an operational system. Also, since Filters actually intercept
all messages before they reach the destination, recovery activities that involve turning
oﬀ, modulating, or even injecting messages into MessageStreams can be implemented
as Filter components. In fact, this functionality is the basis of the CSIR framework
support in Etherware as it allows ﬂexible and extensible management of SIRs.
As we describe later in the chapter, these primitives have been extensively used in the
safety and security mechanisms in the traﬃc control testbed.
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Figure 6.1: Federated software architecture for the traﬃc control testbed
6.2 Security in control
A centralized control system is relatively easy to secure as all software is executed on a single
computer. The security considerations regarding access control can usually be addressed
using standard techniques [81], and the desired security mechanisms can be directly enforced
on the corresponding computer. On the other hand, networked control systems can have
much more complex interactions, particularly between distributed control loops, and hence,
standard security techniques may not be directly applicable. In this section, we present the
principle of safety preserving security trade-oﬀs for networked control systems.
6.2.1 A dichotomy of control
Networked control systems are usually composed of many interacting sub-systems, and the
overall system goals can be decomposed into corresponding sub-goals. In particular, such a
hierarchy of goals usually imposes diﬀerent considerations at diﬀerent layers of the hierar-
chy. For instance, consider the federated architecture for the traﬃc control testbed shown
in Figure 6.1. In this conﬁguration, each car has a Local Supervisor that supervises the
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Controller based on individual goals of the car. However, such distributed operation does
not address the global goal of gridlock free operation. Instead, this is addressed by a Global
Supervisor that preempts the Local Supervisor when necessary. This modiﬁed architecture
clearly brings out the diﬀerent considerations at diﬀerent layers in a control hierarchy.
The part-whole relationship between a networked control system and its sub-systems
illustrated in Figure 6.1 usually leads to the following dichotomy of control:
• Discretionary control: Lower level controllers exert discretionary control over their
corresponding sub-systems. In Figure 6.1, the Local Supervisor operates the car based
on individual goals.
• Mandatory control: Higher level controllers exert mandatory control over the sub-
systems that they supervise. In Figure 6.1, the Global Supervisor overrides Local
Supervisors to avoid gridlocks in the testbed.
This architecture is much more scalable than that in Figure 5.1 since Local Supervisors
can eﬃciently operate in a distributed fashion, while the Global Supervisor can still address
gridlocks in the system when necessary.
6.2.2 Safety preserving security overrides
The dichotomy of control illustrated in Figure 6.1 is particularly signiﬁcant for security con-
siderations. During normal operation, most of the sub-systems are operated under discre-
tionary control for eﬃciency, and the local components have regular permissions. However,
when a security breach occurs, the local permissions need to be reduced, and the system
needs to be operated under mandatory control so that the failure can be addressed much
more eﬀectively.
This characterization is well represented in regular city traﬃc. During normal operation,
drivers operate their respective cars to accomplish individual goals, and all drivers have
101
Controller ActuatorSafetyMechanism
Security
Override
Controls
Filter 1 Filter 2
Figure 6.2: Ordering of Filters in a MessageStream
equal permissions at roads and intersections. However, when a security breach occurs due to
a rogue car driver, mandatory control is exerted by police cars so that they can eﬀectively
bring the situation under control. In particular, during such override, regular cars have
reduced permissions and must yield to police cars.
Control systems typically have many low-level fail-safes to provide safety guarantees
in the system. Some of these guarantees could be critical to system safety, and hence, the
corresponding safety mechanisms must not be preempted by security overrides. For instance,
in the scenario discussed above, drivers must still ensure that they yield safely and do not
cause accidents. Similarly, even though police cars have higher permissions for a road, they
must still wait for other cars to clear out so that they can drive without accidents as well.
This important observation is stated in the following principle.
Principle 6.2.1 The principle of safety preserving security overrides states that higher level
security overrides must preserve lower level safety features as far as possible.
In the remainder, we establish the importance of this principle through a detailed case-
study in the testbed.
6.2.3 Etherware mechanisms
The goals of security are usually addressed by prevention, detection, and recovery activi-
ties [81]. In networked control systems, detection and recovery mechanisms are typically
expressible as SIRs. Hence, the Etherware mechanisms described in Section 6.1.3 are appli-
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cable to these mechanisms as well. On the other hand, prevention measures are typically
part of standard system design and must be considered on an application speciﬁc basis.
There is, however, an interesting Etherware feature that can be directly used in applying
the principle of safety preserving security overrides. There can be multiple message Filters
for an entity in Etherware, and such Filters always have a well deﬁned order. For instance,
of the two Filters shown in Figure 6.2, Filter 2 has a higher priority than Filter 1 because
all messages forwarded by Filter 1 are in turn intercepted by Filter 2. As the ﬁgure demon-
strates, this ordering between Filters can be used to implement safety preserving security
overrides in a natural fashion.
In general, security overrides are usually safety preserving if they do not preempt the
control exerted by safety mechanisms over system actuators.
6.3 Safety in the testbed
Collision avoidance is the main safety issue that we address in this section. The objective is
to ensure that cars do not collide while accomplishing individual goals. Although the city
traﬃc Supervisor in Figure 5.1 generates collision free trajectories for cars, some collisions
still occur as Controllers cannot always accurately follow their given trajectories. Also,
obstacles such as stationary cars are not taken into account by the Supervisor and may
cause collisions as well. Further, in other scenarios such as trajectory tracking, Supervisors
may not even provide collision free trajectories. Consequently, there is a need for a simple
and uniform collision avoidance sub-system to ensure system safety in the testbed.
6.3.1 Architecture
The collision avoidance sub-system was developed in collaboration with Hans-Joerg Schuetz
[82]. The software architecture for this sub-system is shown in Figure 6.3. The main compo-
nents of this sub-system are the CollisionAvoidanceFilter (CA Filter) and the CollisionAvoid-
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Figure 6.3: Software architecture for collision avoidance in the testbed
anceSupervisor (CA Supervisor). The CA Supervisor is a centralized entity that monitors
all cars in the testbed, while there is a CA Filter for each operational car.
The collision avoidance sub-system is activated by adding a CA Filter as a Filter to the
control MessageStream from the Controller to the Actuator of each car. Subsequently, the
CA Filter intercepts all controls sent by the Controller, and forwards only those controls to
the Actuator that ensure collision-free operation of the car. In particular, if a sequence of
controls would cause the car to collide with another car, then the CA Filter sends fail-safe
stop controls instead. Also, the pre-clearance computations in the CA Filter are based on fu-
ture car position estimates generated by the Controller as part of the control MessageStream.
The main idea in the above approach to collision avoidance is to ensure that cars move
only in pre-cleared areas. Since these areas are guaranteed to be non-intersecting, the cars do
not collide as long as they are within their respective pre-cleared areas. The pre-clearance of
cars is regulated by the CA Supervisor, and individual CA Filters must request pre-clearance
from it. Since the CA Supervisor maintains the set of all assigned pre-cleared areas, it
can ensure that subsequent pre-clearance assignments cause no collisions. Also, the CA
Supervisor tracks obstacles such as stationary cars that can be monitored by the vision sub-
system, and ensures that pre-clearance assignments do not intersect these obstacles either.
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Finally, CA Filters request sequences of pre-cleared areas so that they do not have to contact
the CA Supervisor on every control update. This improves overall system performance and
scalability.
6.3.2 Algorithms
We now describe the main algorithms implemented in the collision avoidance sub-system
in Figure 6.3. This description will also inform our subsequent analysis to establish safety
guarantees provided by this sub-system.
CA Supervisor algorithm:
1. Connect to the vision feedback MulticastStream to get feedback about the testbed.
2. Wait for updates from the VisionServer and connection requests from CA Filters.
(a) When an update from the VisionServer arrives, update the set of areas occupied
by obstacles in the testbed.
(b) When a CA Filter connects, open a MessageStream to send responses to pre-
clearance requests.
(c) When a request for a sequence of pre-clearance arrives from a CA Filter:
i. Remove the pre-cleared areas previously assigned to the associated car from
the set of pre-cleared areas.
ii. Find the maximum sub-sequence that does not intersect with assigned pre-
cleared areas or perceived obstacles.
iii. Add the maximum sub-sequence to the set of assigned pre-cleared areas.
iv. Send a pre-clearance response to the CA Filter approving the computed sub-
sequence of pre-cleared areas.
CA Filter algorithm:
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1. Connect to the CA Supervisor and create a MessageStream for sending pre-clearance
requests. If a CA Supervisor is not found, then disable collision avoidance for the car.
2. Create a Filter to intercept control messages from the Controller to the Actuator.
3. Wait for intercepted control messages and responses from the CA Supervisor.
(a) When an intercepted control message arrives:
i. If there is pre-clearance for a suﬃciently long sub-sequence of controls, then
send the cleared controls to the Actuator.
ii. If there isn’t suﬃcient pre-clearance for these controls, then request for addi-
tional pre-clearance from the CA Supervisor, and send a stop control to the
Actuator.
(b) When a pre-clearance response arrives from the CA Supervisor, send any pending
cleared controls to the Actuator.
There are a two important protocol considerations in the operation of a CA Filter. First,
the CA Filter sends a pre-clearance request to the CA Supervisor only after it has received
a pre-clearance response for a previous request. This ensures that both the CA Filter and
the CA Supervisor have a consistent view of the pre-clearance for the associated car.
Second, due to possible failure of the CA Supervisor, or packet losses over the network, a
pre-clearance request may not always result in a response. In such a situation, a CA Filter
gets into a deadlock as it awaits a response from the CA Supervisor, which in turn is waiting
for a subsequent pre-clearance request from the CA Filter. This is addressed by having a
time-out at the CA Filter, so that if there is no response for a pre-clearance request for
a given interval of time, then the CA Filter assumes that the request was lost, and sends
another request if necessary. Also, if a suﬃcient number of consecutive requests do not elicit
response, then the CA Filter assumes that the CA Supervisor is down, and disables collision
avoidance for the car.
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6.3.3 Analysis
We now prove that there are no collisions under the collision avoidance sub-system of Figure
6.3. In the following analysis, we assume that the car position estimates provided by the
Controller in the control MessageStream have bounded error according to Theorem 5.4.1,
and that this is accounted for in the pre-clearance computations of the CA Filter.
Lemma 6.3.1 If the CA Supervisor is operational, then the pre-cleared areas assigned to
diﬀerent cars do not intersect.
Proof The CA Supervisor is the only component in the system that can assign pre-cleared
areas. Also, the CA Supervisor assigns a pre-cleared area to a car only if it does not inter-
sect with any pre-cleared area previously assigned to other cars in the testbed. Hence, the
pre-cleared areas assigned to diﬀerent cars do not intersect. 
Lemma 6.3.2 If the CA Filter of a car is operational and not preempted, and the CA
Supervisor is operational, then the corresponding car moves only within its set of pre-cleared
areas.
Proof Firstly, the set of pre-cleared areas stored in a CA Filter is always a subset of
the pre-cleared areas assigned to its car by the CA Supervisor. This follows from the fact
that the CA Filter has at most one pre-clearance request awaiting response from the CA
Supervisor, and the fact that the CA Filter sets its pre-cleared areas only after it receives a
response from the CA Supervisor.
Secondly, since the CA Filter is not preempted by another Filter in the control Mes-
sageStream from the Controller to the Actuator, the controls that are ﬁnally executed by
the Actuator are exactly the controls approved by the CA Filter.
Finally, the CA Filter only approves controls that operate the car within the set of pre-
cleared areas for the car. Since the collision avoidance sub-system is active when the CA
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Supervisor is operational, it follows that the corresponding car moves only within its set of
pre-cleared areas assigned by the CA Supervisor. 
Theorem 6.3.3 If the CA Filter of all cars are operational and not preempted, the cen-
tral CA Supervisor is operational, and all obstacles in the track are stationary and can be
monitored by the vision system, then there are no collisions between cars or obstacles in the
testbed under the collision avoidance sub-system.
Proof The pre-cleared areas assigned to diﬀerent cars do not intersect with each other by
Lemma 6.3.1. Also, since the obstacles are observable, the CA Supervisor ensures that the
pre-cleared areas assigned to a car do not intersect with these as well. Further, since the
obstacles are stationary and accounted for during pre-clearance assignment, there cannot
be any obstacle in any pre-cleared area for any car in the testbed. Finally, since cars move
only within their respective pre-cleared areas by Lemma 6.3.2, they do not collide with other
cars or obstacles in the testbed. Consequently, it follows that there are no collisions in the
testbed under the collision avoidance sub-system. 
6.4 Security case-study
In this section, we present a detailed case-study to validate the principle of safety preserving
security overrides in the traﬃc control testbed. In particular, the collision avoidance sub-
system described in Section 6.3 serves as the low-level safety mechanism for the case-study.
6.4.1 Scenario
For the case-study, we consider three kinds of cars: regular cars, rogue cars, and police cars.
All these cars operate in a city traﬃc scenario with well-deﬁned traﬃc rules. The regular
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cars and police cars are operated by Controllers and Actuators, while rogue cars are operated
manually. The regular cars drive along the traﬃc grid based on traﬃc rules, and visit various
points on the grid based on individual goals. The rogue cars are driven arbitrarily, while the
police cars pursue the rogue cars following traﬃc rules as well.
The security scenario studied is as follows. Initially, there are no rogue cars in the
traﬃc grid. The regular cars are driven according to individual goals, while the police cars
are parked in strategic locations. A single rogue car is then introduced into the traﬃc
constituting a security breach. As a security response, the police cars must then pursue the
rogue car as closely as possible while still following traﬃc rules. Meanwhile, the regular cars
continue driving based on their individual goals.
The two main objectives for the scenario are:
• Safety objective: The safety objective is to ensure collision-free operation of cars.
• Security objective: The security objective is to ensure that police cars pursue the rogue
car as closely as possible.
6.4.2 Architecture
The software architecture for the security case-study is shown in Figure 6.4. This incor-
porates the collision avoidance safety sub-system of Figure 6.3, along with the federated
supervisory control of Figure 6.1. In particular, the security override of local supervision
preserves the safety mechanisms of the collision avoidance sub-system.
The Local Supervisors exert discretionary control, while the Global Supervisor enforces
mandatory control with security overrides. The Local Supervisors for the regular cars plan
routes for their respective cars, based on the discrete bin traﬃc grid model described in
Section 2.2. Similarly, the Local Supervisors for the police cars plan routes for pursuing the
rogue car, based on the same model. On the other hand, the Global Supervisor implements
both these functionalities, i.e., routing regular cars to individual destinations, and supervis-
109
VisionSensor 1
VisionSensor 2
VisionServer
CA Supervisor
Car
Actuator
Controller
CA Filter
Local
SupervisorSupervisor
Global
Override
MessageStream
LEGEND
MulticastStream
MessageFilter
Figure 6.4: Software architecture for the security case-study
ing police cars to pursue the rogue car. In addition, the Global Supervisor also schedules
collision-free trajectories based on the scheduling algorithms described in Section 2.2. Fi-
nally, the Global Supervisor overrides Local Supervisors using the security override Filter
shown in Figure 6.4.
6.4.3 Experiments
We consider four diﬀerent experiments in the traﬃc control testbed, based on the scenario
presented in Section 6.4.1. These experiments correspond to the following conﬁgurations:
1. No collision avoidance or security override: This corresponds to local discretionary
control of cars without low-level safety.
2. Security override without collision avoidance: This corresponds to global mandatory
control of cars, also without low-level safety.
3. Collision avoidance without security override: This corresponds to local discretionary
control with low-level safety.
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Figure 6.5: Experiment 1: No collision avoidance or security override
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Figure 6.6: Experiment 2: Security override without collision avoidance
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Figure 6.7: Experiment 3: Collision avoidance without security override
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Figure 6.8: Experiment 4: Security override with collision avoidance
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4. Security override with collision avoidance: This corresponds to global mandatory con-
trol with low-level safety as well.
Among the above experiments, we are particularly interested in the second and fourth
experiments, since the former corresponds to security override that overrides safety as well,
while in the latter, the security override is safety preserving. Also, in all the four experiments,
we have two police cars that pursue a single rogue car, and two regular cars that follow pre-
speciﬁed goals. The videos for all four experiments can be viewed at our testbed website [83].
Table 6.1: Safety measure for the four scenarios
Collision Avoidance Security Override Time to ﬁrst collision (seconds)
No No 2
No Yes 10
Yes No No collisions
Yes Yes No collisions
Table 6.2: Security measure for the four scenarios
Collision
Avoidance
Security
Override
Minimum of police cars’ distance to rogue car
Mean distance (mm) Std. deviation (mm)
No No 2182.7 1195.5
No Yes 925.6 833.5
Yes No 913.0 785.0
Yes Yes 766.1 578.2
In Table 6.1, we note the safety performance of the system for all the experiments. In
particular, our safety measure is the time to the ﬁrst collision in each experiment. Similarly,
we also tabulate the security performance in Table 6.2, where the security measure is the
minimum distance between the rogue car and any of the police cars. In addition, we plot
the graphs for the distance between the rogue and each police car in corresponding ﬁgures.
For the ﬁrst experiment, the distance between the police cars and the rogue car is shown
in Figure 6.5. As the plots illustrate, the police cars are not very successful in following the
rogue car. This is primarily due to the frequent collisions that occur as the cars operate
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without coordination or collision avoidance. In particular, the ﬁrst collision occurs only 2s
into the experiment as we note in Table 6.1.
The situation is drastically improved in the second experiment when the security override
enforces global supervision. The police cars now have higher priority in the system, and their
improved performance is shown in Figure 6.6. However, while global supervision enforces
collision free car schedules, there still are some collisions due to the slower response times of
the supervisor. In fact, the ﬁrst collision occurs about 8s into the experiment as Table 6.1
shows.
The safety in the system is further improved by the collision avoidance mechanism in the
third experiment, where there are no collisions as shown in Table 6.1. In fact, as illustrated
in Figure 6.6 and Table 6.2, the overall security performance is even better than in the second
experiment even though there is no security override. However, police cars can be preempted
by regular cars as demonstrated by the degraded performance of the second police car. More
importantly, the lack of global supervision can lead to gridlocks1 in the system and severely
aﬀect security performance.
However, the best performance, in terms of both safety and security, was during the
fourth experiment, where the security override was enforced while preserving low-level safety.
There were no collisions as shown in Table 6.1, and the cars were able to pursue the rogue
car more eﬀectively than in the other three experiments, as shown in Figure 6.8 and Tables
6.2. The global supervisory control ensured that the police cars had a higher priority than
the regular cars. The overall safety was improved due to the collision avoidance mechanism,
and in particular, the absence of collisions also contributed to the better performance of the
police cars.
These experiments demonstrate the importance of preserving low-level safety mechanisms
while enforcing high-level security overrides in control systems.
1Interestingly, at the end of the third experiment, there was a gridlock involving the two regular cars at
a major intersection. This can be seen in the corresponding video at the testbed website [83].
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Chapter 7
PROOF OF SYSTEM-WIDE
SAFETY AND LIVENESS
The main result we prove in this chapter is that, given a road network with single-lane
straight roads of suﬃcient length and width, angles of lane intersections, a set of cars with
speciﬁed steering radii and bounded speed, real-time guarantees for renewal feedback about
cars, and initial positions of the cars, the cars can be driven to their destinations without
collisions (safety guarantee) or gridlocks (liveness guarantee), while staying within the con-
ﬁnes of corresponding lanes (tracking guarantee). This result establishes properties of an
overall system involving the convergence of control with communication and computation,
and can serve as a possible prototype of such proofs for other networked control systems.
We begin with an overview of the main result. For the analysis, we consider road networks
with straight line road segments and angled intersections as shown in Figure 7.1. Let L be
the minimum length of the straight line segments, γ the maximum angle of intersection
between any two lane segments, and W the minimum width of lanes. Suppose also that the
cars are equipped with four steering controls: two causing anti-clockwise trajectories of radii
R and R, and the other two causing clockwise trajectories of radii R and R. In particular, let
R < R as shown in Figure 7.2. Denote by s the maximum speed of a car. Finally, suppose
we have a real-time guarantee1 which ensures that the maximum time interval between
successive observations and controls for any car is at most T time units as shown in Figure
7.3. So, if we deﬁne
α :=
sT
R
1We will later show real-time scheduling algorithms that guarantee such schedulability
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Figure 7.1: Road network with single lane roads
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Figure 7.2: Clockwise steering controls for a car
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Figure 7.3: Real-time guarantee ti+1 − ti ≤ T for car control
and β = cos−1(2 cosα− 1), then the real-time guarantee implies that a car moves a distance
of at most D = sT = Rα, before it is next observed and controlled.
Given the above characteristics of individual sub-systems, we show that a set of cars
can be driven to their destinations in the road network without collisions or gridlocks, while
staying within the conﬁnes of corresponding lanes, if
L ≥ 2γRR
R− R
W ≥ R(2− cosβ(2 cosα− cos γ))
α ≤ π/3
7.1 Scheduling renewal tasks
The evolution of state prediction error characterized in Theorem 5.4.1 shows that, with
accurate feedback, the error in car trajectory can be bounded if the maximum time interval
between any two consecutive feedback updates can be also bounded. In other words, an
accurate feedback update essentially resets the error in the car position estimate to zero,
and acts as a “renewal point” for the state prediction process. Hence, the real-time guarantee
of interest is to ensure that the maximum time interval between any two consecutive feedback
updates is bounded. In this section, we formalize this requirement as the renewal task model,
and present scheduling policies for renewal task sets.
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7.1.1 Renewal task model
A task is a sequence of jobs that execute on, or are computed by, a speciﬁed resource. In
this chapter, we only consider renewal tasks, which are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 7.1.1 In a renewal task, each job has a ﬁxed computation time C, a relative
deadline D, and a new job is released immediately after a previous job is completed. A
renewal task is characterized by its task density ρ = C/D.
In this section, we consider the problem of scheduling a set of n renewal tasks S =
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}, on a common resource, starting at time t = 0. Each task σi ∈ S is char-
acterized by its task density ρi = Ci/Di, where Ci ∈ Z+ is the ﬁxed computation time and
Di ∈ Z+ is the relative deadline of each job of σi. In the remainder, we assume that ρi > 0
for all tasks σi ∈ S.
7.1.2 Prior work
Renewal tasks are interesting from a real-time scheduling point of view because they cannot
be properly scheduled by standard non-idling policies such as Earliest Deadline First (EDF)
[84] [7]. We illustrate this with a simple example. Consider a renewal task set S = {σ1, σ2}
with ρ1 = 1/2 and ρ2 = 2/4, by which we mean C2 = 2 and D2 = 4. This task set satisﬁes
the EDF schedulability criterion ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ 1. The schedule generated by EDF for the task
set S is shown in Figure 7.4.
Since EDF basically schedules the job with the earliest deadline at any given time t, the
ﬁrst job of task σ1 is scheduled at time t = 0 as it has the earliest deadline. Similarly, the
second job of σ1 is scheduled at time t = 1. At time t = 2, there are two choices since
the corresponding jobs for both tasks σ1 and σ2 have the same deadline. However, choosing
σ1 at t = 2 leads to a deadline miss for σ2 at time t = 4 as shown in Figure 7.4(a), while
choosing σ2 at t = 2 leads to a deadline miss for σ1 at time t = 4 as shown in Figure 7.4(b).
Consequently, renewal task sets cannot be scheduled by EDF in general.
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NOTE: Denotes task renewal
Deadline missed
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
ρ1 = 1/2
ρ2 = 2/4
(a) Task σ1 chosen at time t = 2
NOTE: Denotes task renewal
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
Deadline missed
ρ1 = 1/2
ρ2 = 2/4
(b) Task σ2 chosen at time t = 2
Figure 7.4: Renewal task set not schedulable under EDF
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NOTE: Denotes task renewal
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ρ1 = 1/2
ρ2 = 2/4
Figure 7.5: Renewal task set partial schedule under PSP
An elegant policy for scheduling renewal task sets has been presented by Han, Lin, and
Hou in [85]. The main idea is to map this scheduling problem into a pin-wheel scheduling
problem and apply well known pin-wheel scheduling algorithms such as Sa, Sx, Sbc, Sby,
and Sxy [86], [87]. However, the schedulability condition is
∑
i σi ≤ 1 only if the Di’s are all
multiples of some Dj, and
∑
i σi ≤ n(21/n − 1) in the general case. In contrast, the policies
presented in this section can all schedule any renewal task set that satisﬁes
∑
i σi ≤ 1.
7.1.3 A non-resource-sharing policy
All the policies presented in Section 7.1.2 are non-resource-sharing policies since only one
task consumes the resource at a given time. We now consider the Proportional Scheduling
Policy (PSP), which is a non-resource-sharing policy deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7.1.2 Proportional Scheduling Policy (PSP) schedules tasks periodically so that
in each successive interval of unit length, each task gets a time-share that is at least as large
as its task density.
We illustrate PSP using the same task set S = {σ1, σ2} considered in Section 7.1.2,
with ρ1 = 1/2 and ρ2 = 2/4. A partial schedule for this task set under PSP is shown in
Figure 7.5. In this schedule, each successive unit time interval is divided into two equal sub-
intervals, so that σ1 is scheduled during the ﬁrst sub-interval, and σ2 is scheduled during the
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NOTE: Denotes task renewal
ρi = Ci/Di
Di
t∆
ti ti + Di
Figure 7.6: Partial schedule under PSP for task σi with renewal at tm
second sub-interval. We can easily extend this partial schedule to verify that all deadlines
are satisﬁed.
We now characterize the schedulability condition under which renewal task sets are
schedulable2 under PSP in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1.3 A renewal task set S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} is schedulable under PSP if and
only if the task densities satisfy
n∑
i=1
ρi ≤ 1.
where Ci, Di ∈ Z+ for all σi ∈ S.
Proof If
∑
i ρi > 1, then the task set is clearly not schedulable as the demands exceed
capacity. So, this condition is clearly necessary.
Suppose a task set S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} satisﬁes
∑
i ρi ≤ 1. Consider a task σi ∈ S, and
suppose that it has a renewal at time ti. The partial schedule for the next job of σi is shown
in Figure 7.6. In particular, the deadline of this job is (ti +Di), and it needs at least Ci time
units of the resource for completion.
Now, in each successive unit time interval within Ti = (ti, ti + Di), the task σi is sched-
uled for at least ρi time units under PSP. Also, as shown in Figure 7.6, σi is scheduled
2A task set is said to be schedulable by a policy if it can be scheduled by the policy so that no deadlines
are missed.
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for t∆ time units immediately after its renewal at time ti, and for (ρi − t∆) time units im-
mediately before (ti + Di). Hence, in the interval Ti, the task σi is scheduled for at least
t∆ + (Di − 1)ρi + (ρi − t∆) = Di ∗ ρi = Ci time units. Consequently, the next job of σi
completes by its deadline. Finally, since we arbitrarily chose a job and a task, the same
argument applies to all jobs in the system. 
7.1.4 Resource-sharing policies
We now consider resource sharing policies for scheduling renewal task sets where more than
one task can share the resource at a given time. We begin with some additional deﬁnitions
for renewal tasks.
Deﬁnitions
Consider a set of renewal tasks S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}. For a renewal task σi ∈ S, since a
new job is released immediately after a previous job is completed, a job completion is also
called a task renewal. For a given time instant t ≥ 0, ζi(t) represents the time of the next
task renewal of σi after time t. In particular, we always have ζi(t) > t for all σi ∈ S and
time instants t ≥ 0. Also, subsequent task renewals are represented as ζ2i (t) = ζi(ζi(t)),
ζ3i (t) = ζi(ζi(ζi(t))), etc. However, we deﬁne ζ
0
i (t) = t for convenience.
Further, ζ(t) is the next renewal of any task in S after time t ≥ 0, i.e.,
ζ(t) = min
σi∈S
ζi(t).
Similarly, ζˆ(t) is the last renewal of any task in S before time3 t > 0, i.e.,
ζˆ(t) = max{ζ i(0) ≤ t | i ∈ Z+}.
3ζˆi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ Z+.
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Finally, a system renewal occurs when all tasks have a renewal at the same time. For
a given time instant t ≥ 0, Z(t) represents the next system renewal of the task set S after
t, and Zˆ(t) represents the previous system renewal before t. As before, subsequent system
renewals are represented as Z2(t) = Z(Z(t)), Z3(t) = Z(Z(Z(t))), etc.
Admissible scheduling policies
A scheduling policy allocates the common resource among currently executing jobs of the
task set S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}. More formally, given a time interval T , a scheduling policy
allocates τi(T ) ∈ R+ time units of the resource to each task σi ∈ S during the interval T .
Also, τ0(T ) ∈ R+ represents the idle time of the resource during T which is not allocated to
any task in S. For convenience, deﬁne τi(t) = τi([0, t]) for i = 0, . . . , n.
Since not all possible scheduling policies are reasonable, an admissible scheduling policy
is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7.1.4 An admissible scheduling policy is an allocation (τ0(t), τ1(t), . . . , τn(t)) for
t ≥ 0 such that τi(t) are continuous and non-decreasing functions of time t for i = 0, . . . , n,
and
n∑
i=0
τi(t) = t.
Proportional Share Scheduling Policy
We now deﬁne a resource sharing version of the Proportional Scheduling Policy (PSP) pre-
sented in Section 7.1.3.
Deﬁnition 7.1.5 The Proportional Share Scheduling Policy (PSSP) allocates the resource
proportionally to all tasks in a task set S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}, i.e., for any task σi ∈ S, we
have
τi(T ) = |T | ∗ ρi∑n
j=1 ρj
.
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PSSP is clearly an admissible scheduling policy. The schedulability criterion for renewal
task sets under PSSP is also easily obtained as follows.
Theorem 7.1.6 A renewal task set S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} is schedulable under PSSP if and
only if the task densities satisfy
n∑
i=1
ρi ≤ 1.
Proof If
∑
i ρi > 1, then the task set is clearly not schedulable as the demands exceed
capacity. So, this condition is clearly necessary.
Suppose a task set S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} with
∑
i ρi ≤ 1 is not schedulable under PSP.
Since task renewals are countable, we can consider the ﬁrst time tm at which a deadline is
missed in a PSP schedule for this task set. Let σm ∈ S be the corresponding task that missed
its deadline at tm. Now, the last task renewal of σm before tm occurred at time (tm −Dm).
However, in the time interval Tm = (tm −Dm, tm), we have
τm(Tm) = |Tm| ∗ ρm∑n
j=1 ρj
≥ |Tm| ∗ ρm = Cm
under PSSP since
∑
i ρi ≤ 1, ρm = Cm/Dm, and |Tm| = Dm. Hence, σm cannot miss a
deadline at tm, which is a contradiction. 
Highest Scaled critical-ratio First policy
We now exhibit schedulability of renewal tasks through another interesting class of resource
sharing admissible scheduling policies.
We begin with some additional deﬁnitions for renewal task sets. Consider a set of renewal
tasks S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}. For a renewal task σi ∈ S, and a given time instant t ≥ 0, ηi(t)
is the number of jobs completed for task σi until time t, i.e.,
ηi(t) := max{n ∈ Z+ | ζni (0) ≤ t}.
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A renewal task always has exactly one unﬁnished job that needs to be scheduled. Hence,
deﬁne di(t) as the deadline of the current job of task σi at time t ≥ 0. The remaining
computation time ci(t) of the current job of task σi is then given by
ci(t) := (ηi(t) + 1)Ci − τi(t), (7.1)
which leads to the following deﬁnition of a critical ratio.
Deﬁnition 7.1.7 Critical ratio κi(t) of a task σi ∈ S at time t ≥ 0 is deﬁned as
κi(t) :=
ci(t)
di(t)
Instead of using critical ratios directly, we break jobs virtually into “sub-jobs” so that
the corresponding sub-jobs of all tasks have the same deadlines. Consequently, we render
the corresponding critical ratios all have the same denominator at any given time t > 0.
Deﬁne d¯(t) to be the next deadline among the jobs in the system at time t > 0, i.e.,
d¯(t) := min
σi∈S
{di(t)}, (7.2)
and the remaining computation time c¯i(t) of the “sub-job” of task σi ∈ S as
c¯i(t) = κi(ζˆ(t))d¯(ζˆ(t))− τi([ζˆ(t), t]), (7.3)
where τi([ζˆ(t), t]) is the amount of work done on the current job of task σi in the interval
[ζˆ(t), t]. Now we deﬁne what we mean by scaled critical ratios.
Deﬁnition 7.1.8 The scaled critical ratio κ¯i(t) of a task σi ∈ S at time t ≥ 0 is deﬁned as
κ¯i(t) :=
c¯i(t)
d¯(t)
.
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Deﬁnition 7.1.9 The scaled system critical ratio κ¯(t) is the maximum of the scaled critical
ratios of all tasks in S at time t ≥ 0, i.e.,
κ¯(t) := max{κ¯i(t) | σi ∈ S}.
Deﬁnition 7.1.10 Scaled critical task set Sκ¯(t) is the set of tasks whose critical ratio is
equal to the scaled system critical ratio at time t ≥ 0, i.e.,
Sκ¯(t) = {σi ∈ S | κ¯i(t) = κ¯(t)}.
Also, for a time interval T , we have
Sκ¯(T ) =
⋃
t∈T
Sκ¯(t).
Finally, the class of Highest Scaled critical-ratio First policies is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7.1.11 Highest Scaled critical-ratio First (HSF) is the class of admissible schedul-
ing policies that enforce the condition
∫ ∞
0
I(κ¯i(t) < κ¯(t))dτi(t) = 0, (7.4)
for all tasks σi ∈ S, where I(·) is the indicator function.
Equation 7.4 basically ensures that a task σi ∈ S is actively processed only when κ¯i(t) =
κ¯(t). In the following development, we refer to the class of HSF policies collectively as HSF
for convenience.
Clearly, HSF is a non-idling policy as it always schedules tasks with the highest critical
ratio. In addition, we also have the following properties for critical functions under HSF.
Proposition 7.1.12 The following properties hold for a renewal task set S = {σ1, . . . , σn}
scheduled by HSF:
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1. c¯i(t), d¯(t), κ¯i(t), κ¯(t), ci(t), di(t), and κi(t) are right continuous for i = 1, . . . , n and
t ≥ 0.
2. c¯i(t), d¯(t), κ¯i(t), κ¯(t), ci(t), di(t), and κi(t) are continuous in the interval Tζ(t) =
(ζˆ(t), ζ(t)) for i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0.
Proof
1. Since HSF is an admissible scheduling policy, τi(t) are continuous for i = 0, . . . , n
and t ≥ 0. Consequently, c¯i(t) are right continuous by eq (7.3). Also, di(t) are
right continuous as they increase linearly with time t except for jumps at renewals of
corresponding σi. Hence, d¯(t) is right continuous as it is equal to the smallest of the
di(t), and jumps only when the corresponding task σi has a renewal. By deﬁnition, it
follows that κ¯i(t) are also right continuous. Also, since κ¯(t) is the maximum of ﬁnitely
many right continuous functions, it is also right continuous. Similarly, since τi(t) are
continuous for i = 0, . . . , n and t ≥ 0, ci(t) are right continuous by eq (7.1). Hence, it
follows that κi(t) are right continuous functions as well.
2. As noted above, τi(t) are continuous for i = 0, . . . , n and t ≥ 0 under HSF. Also, there
are no job completions during the interval Tζ(t) = (ζˆ(t), ζ(t)) for any task in S. Hence,
c¯i(t) are continuous in Tζ(t) by eq (7.3). Similarly, di(t) and d¯(t) are also continuous in
Tζ(t). Consequently, κ¯i(t) are continuous in the interval Tζ(t) as well. Also, since κ¯(t)
is the maximum of ﬁnitely many continuous functions, it is also continuous in Tζ(t).
The functions ci(t) and κi(t) are continuous in the interval Tζ due to the same reason.

Since the functions κ¯i(t) and κ¯(t) are continuous in the interval Tζ(t) = (ζˆ(t), ζ(t)) for
a given time instant t > 0, it follows that there is a sub-interval T ⊆ (t, ζ(t)) during which
the scaled critical task set is constant, i.e., Sκ¯(T ) = Sκ¯(t). Hence, the following interval is
well-deﬁned.
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Deﬁnition 7.1.13 For a given time instant t > 0, the job-constancy interval Tκ¯(t) is deﬁned
to be the maximal interval starting at t during which the scaled critical task set is constant,
i.e., Sκ¯(Tκ¯(t)) = Sκ¯(t).
We now characterize the evolution of κ¯(t) in the interval (t, ζ(t)).
Lemma 7.1.14 For a renewal task set S = {σ1, . . . , σn} scheduled by HSF, if for some
t0 ≥ 0 we have ∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0)
κ¯i(t0) ≤ 1− ,
then for any interval T = (t0, t) ⊆ Tκ¯(t0), we have
κ¯(t) ≤ κ¯(t0)− |T |
m(d¯(t0)− |T |))
,
where m = |Sκ¯(t0)|.
Proof Suppose there is a time interval Tf = (t0, tf) ⊆ Tκ¯(t0) such that
κ¯(tf ) > κ¯(t0)− |Tf |
m(d¯(t0)− |Tf |))
.
Since tf is in the job-constancy interval of t, we have
κ¯i(t) > κ¯i(t0)− |Tf |
m(d¯(t0)− |Tf |))
for all σi ∈ Sκ¯(t0). By deﬁnition of κ¯i(t), this is equivalent to
c¯i(t0)− τi(Tf)
d¯(t0)− |Tf |
>
c¯i(t0)
d¯(t0)
− |Tf |
m(d¯(t0)− |Tf |))
,
which holds if and only if
c¯i(t0)
d¯(t0)
>
τi(Tf)
|Tf | −

m
.
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Summing the above inequality for all σi ∈ Sκ¯(t0), we have
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0)
c¯i(t0)
d¯i(t0)
>
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0)
τi(Tf )
|Tf | −
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0)

m
.
Since HSF is an admissible policy, and Tf ⊆ Tκ¯(t0), we have
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0) τi(Tf ) = Tf .
Hence, the above inequality simpliﬁes to
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0)
κ¯i(t0) > 1− ,
which is a contradiction. 
Theorem 7.1.15 For a renewal task set S = {σ1, . . . , σn} scheduled by HSF, if for some
t0 ≥ 0 we have ∑
σi∈S
κ¯i(t0) ≤ 1
then ζ(t0) =
∑
σi∈S c¯i(t0).
Proof Suppose Sκ¯(t0)  S and let σj ∈ S \ Sκ¯(t0) be a non-critical task at t0. By Lemma
7.1.14, the scaled critical ratio κ¯(t) decreases in the job-constancy interval Tκ¯(t0), and κ¯j(t)
increases in the same interval. Hence, there is a ﬁrst time instant tj at which σj ∈ Sκ¯(t)
joins the scaled critical task set and is scheduled by HSF. Clearly (tj− t0) < d¯(t0), otherwise
the sub-jobs of the tasks in Sκ¯(t0) would complete, and we would have κ¯(t
′) = 0 for some
t′ < d¯(t0), which is impossible.
We will now show that ∑
σi∈S
κ¯i(tj) ≤ 1. (7.5)
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By Lemma 7.1.14, the above inequality holds if we have
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0)
(
κ¯i(t0)− |Tj |
m(d¯(t0)− |Tj|)
)
+
∑
σi /∈Sκ¯(t0)
κ¯i(tj) ≤ 1
where m = |Sκ¯(t0)|, Tj = (t0, tj), and  = 1−
∑
σi∈Sκ¯(t0) κ¯(t0). This can be simpliﬁed to get
mκ¯(t0)− |Tj|
d¯(t0)− |Tj| +
∑
σi /∈Sκ¯(t0) c¯j(t0)
d¯(t0)− |Tj | ≤ 1.
By rearranging terms, and noting that κ¯i(t0) = c¯i(t0)/d¯(t0), we can rewrite the above
inequality as
|Tj |(1−  + mκ¯(t0)) ≤ d¯(t0)(1−
∑
σi /∈Sκ¯(t0)
κ¯j(t0)−mκ¯(t0))
But this inequality holds since 0 < |Tj| < d¯(t0) and
∑
σi /∈Sκ¯(t0) κ¯i(t0) ≤ . Hence, the
inequality (7.5) holds as well.
Since the number of tasks in S is ﬁnite, we can repeat the same argument to ﬁnd a time
t with (t − t0) < d¯(t0) such that Sκ¯(t) = S. Hence, all the tasks share the resource in the
job-constancy interval Tκ¯(t), at the end of which the corresponding sub-jobs are completed.
Since HSF is non-idling, this occurs at time ζ(t0) =
∑
σi∈S c¯i(t0). 
We now characterize the schedulability condition for renewal task sets under HSF.
Lemma 7.1.16 For a renewal task set S = {σ1, . . . , σn} scheduled by HSF, if
∑n
i=1 ρi ≤ 1
and κ¯i(0) ≤ ρi for all σi ∈ S, then κ¯i(ζk(0)) ≤ ρi for all tasks σi ∈ S and k = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Proof We prove this by induction on k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The induction basis for ζ0(0) = 0
is trivial. For the induction step, suppose the result holds for some k, and for convenience
deﬁne tk = ζ
k(0) and tk+1 = ζ
k+1(0). Again, a task σi ∈ S with di(tk) = d¯(tk) has a
renewal at tk+1 by Theorem 7.1.15, and hence κ¯i(tk+1) = κi(tk+1) = ρi by (7.3). However,
if di(tk) > d¯(tk) then τi([tk, tk+1]) = c¯i(tk), and since tk+1 ≤ d¯(tk) from Theorem 7.1.15, by
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(7.3) we have
κ¯i(tk+1) = κi(tk+1) =
ci(tk)− c¯i(tk)
di(tk)− tk+1 ≤
ci(tk)− c¯i(tk)
di(tk)− d¯(0) ,
which can be simpliﬁed as
κ¯i(tk+1) ≤ ci(tk)− (ci(tk)/di(tk))d¯(0)
di(tk)− d¯(0) =
ci(tk)
di(tk)
= κi(tk) ≤ ρi.

Theorem 7.1.17 For a renewal task set S = {σ1, . . . , σn}, if
∑n
i=1 ρi ≤ 1 and κ¯i(0) ≤ ρi
for all σi ∈ S, then the task set is schedulable under HSF.
Proof We prove this by induction on task renewals ζk(0) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. For the
induction basis, by Theorem 7.1.15, the jobs of tasks σi ∈ S with di(0) = d¯(0) are completed
at ζ(0) by their deadlines. All other tasks have di(0) > d¯(0), and hence no deadlines are
missed until ζ(0).
For the induction step, suppose no deadlines are missed until ζk(0), and for convenience
deﬁne tk = ζ
k(0) and tk+1 = ζ
k+1(0). By Proposition 7.1.16, we have
∑n
i=1 κ¯i(0) ≤ 1. Hence,
by Theorem 7.1.15 the jobs of tasks σi ∈ S with di(tk) = d¯(ti) are completed at tk+1 by their
deadlines. As before, all other tasks have di(tk) > d¯(tk), and hence no deadlines are missed
until tk+1. 
As a corollary of this theorem, it follows that any admissible policy that provides a
computation time of at least
τi(T
k
ζ (0)) =
ρi|T kζ (0)|∑
j ρj
for each task σi ∈ S, and each interval T kζ (0) = (ζk(0), ζk+1(0)) with k ∈ Z+, will meet all
deadlines.
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Figure 7.7: Control Loop Model
7.2 Controllability of a single car
The renewal task model bounds the maximum separation between any two consecutive
completions of jobs in a task, and the scheduling policies presented in Section 7.1 demonstrate
that this model can be implemented in practice. In this section, we use this guarantee to
formulate and analyze the lower level control loop in the traﬃc control testbed design of
Figure 5.1. In particular, we prove that a car can be controlled so that it stays within a road
lane with a given width.
7.2.1 Car Model
The control loop model that we use for our analysis is shown in Figure 7.7. The feedback
channel from the Sensor to the Controller is scheduled according to the renewal task model.
On the other hand, the Controller and the Actuator are collocated, and there is negligible
delay between a Controller issuing a control, and the Actuator eﬀecting it in the car. But for
the renewal guarantee, this model is a slightly simpliﬁed version of the current conﬁguration
in the testbed described in Section 2.2.
We model a car itself as an oriented point in a lane, and deﬁne the state of a car as the
pair (d, θ), where d is the absolute distance of the car from the center of the lane, and θ is
the angle of the car to the median of the lane. In practice, this point would represent the
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center of the car. Also, the direction of traversal of the lane is assumed to be from left to
right in what follows.
We assume that a car has a single non-zero speed s, and four steering controls: two in
anti-clockwise direction, and two in the clockwise direction. The two anti-clockwise controls
move the car in anti-clockwise circles of radii R and R with R < R. Similarly, the two
clockwise controls move the car in clockwise circles of radii R and R. Based on the renewal
task model for sensory feedback, we also assume that the car can move a distance of at most
Rα before it is observed again. Since the car moves at a constant speed s, this corresponds
to a deadline of Rα/s in the renewal task model. Finally, a control is sent immediately after
the car has been observed; equivalently, the car can move a distance of at most Rα before
the next control is sent.
7.2.2 Controllability in a straight road
We begin by analyzing the controllability of a car along a straight road. Speciﬁcally, we
will try to formulate a control strategy so that a car can be indeﬁnitely maintained within
a straight lane of a given width using the above control loop model. Our strategy will be
to ﬁnd a subset SC of the car state space, so that if the car is in SC when a control is sent,
then it can be indeﬁnitely maintained within SC . For brevity, we will call this set SC , which
can be held invariant through control, a controllable subset.
In the following analysis, we only allow steering controls that move the car in circles of
radius R. Suppose the car is initially in state (0, 0), i.e. it is positioned at the center of the
lane, and oriented along the direction of the road, which is assumed to be from left to right
as noted before. If the car is given the clockwise control, then it moves in a clockwise circle
of radius R and tangential to the center of the lane as shown in Figure 7.8. When we get
to send the next control, the car may have moved a distance of up to Rα along its circle.
Suppose the car does indeed move a distance of Rα before we send the next control. Since
we next see the car to be below the lane, we issue an anti-clockwise control instead. As
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R
R
Figure 7.8: Controllable subset characterization
shown in Figure 7.8, the car will now move in an anticlockwise circle of radius R tangential
to the previous circle. However, the car will still move away from the center of the lane for
sometime, before it recovers. Consequently, the lane must be wide enough to account for
this maneuver.
From Figure 7.8, we can also see that if the car is below the center of the lane initially,
then it can be made to stay within this lane using the anti-clockwise control as long as its
distance and orientation is bounded by the second circle in the ﬁgure. This subset is further
illustrated in Figure 7.9.
One important constraint we want to ensure is that the car is never moving backwards,
i.e., θ ≤ π/2 always. This implies that the maximum permissible angle β ≤ π/2 in Figure
7.9. But, from Figure 7.9, we also have R(1− cosβ) = 2R(1− cosα), which implies cos β =
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Controllable subset
α
β
R
Figure 7.9: Controllable subset and maximum value of α, β
2 cosα− 1, and β ≤ π/2 in turn implies cosα ≥ 1/2, i.e.,
α ≤ π
3
. (7.6)
In the following theorem, we prove that the subset illustrated in Figure 7.9 is actually a
controllable subset for the car.
Theorem 7.2.1 For an inﬁnitely long road of width 2W , where W = R(1− cosβ(2 cosα−
1)), α ≤ π/3, and β = cos−1 (2 cosα− 1), the set
SC = {(d, θ) | d + R(1− cos θ) ≤ W} (7.7)
is a controllable subset of the car. That is, if the state of the car is initially within the subset
SC, then the car can be controlled to stay indeﬁnitely within the lane of width 2W .
Proof We prove this by showing that if the initial car state is in the subset SC = {(d, θ) |
d+R(1− cos θ) ≤ W}, then there exists a control which ensures that the car trajectory will
remain in SC until the next control can be sent.
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Figure 7.10: Possible trajectory for Case I
We need only consider initial car positions in the lower half of the lane, since a symmet-
rical argument applies to the upper half as well. We have two cases for possible initial car
distance d in the lower half of the lane: on the solid curve segment in Figure 7.11(a), and
on the solid curve segment in Figure 7.12(a). In either case, for a given distance d from the
center of the lane, the initial car orientation θ satisﬁes d + R(1− cos θ) ≤ W .
We consider each of these cases in detail.
CASE I
Suppose the initial car position is on the solid curve segment in Figure 7.11(a) so that
distance d and angle θ satisfy d + R(1 − cos θ) ≤ W . It is easy to see that, under the
anti-clockwise control, the subsequent trajectory of the car will be contained in the shaded
region in Figure 7.11(b). Clearly, at all points on all these trajectories, the car state will
satisfy d + R(1 − cos θ) ≤ W . To see this, suppose the initial position (d, θ) satisﬁes d +
R(1 − cos θ) ≤ W . Then, after moving through an angle 0 ≤ γ ≤ α, the new coordinates
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αd = 0, 0 ≤ θ ≤ cos−1(1− W
R
) d = W, θ = 0
R
W
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                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                































Trajectory from
Trajectory from
α
R
d = 0, θ = 0
d = 0, cos θ = 1−W
R
W
W
(b) Trajectory subset enclosure for Case I
Figure 7.11: Initial states and trajectories for Case I
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are d′ = d + R(cos (θ − γ)− cos θ) and θ′ = θ − γ as shown in Figure 7.10. Now,
d′ + R(1− cos θ′) = d + R(cos (θ − γ)− cos θ) + R(1− cos (θ − γ))
= d + R(1− cos θ)
≤ W
as required.
CASE II
Suppose the initial car position is on the solid curve segment in Figure 7.12(a) so that the
distance d and the orientation θ satisfy d+R(1−cos θ) ≤ W . In this case, the anti-clockwise
control may not always ensure that car-states in the subsequent trajectory of the car will
satisfy d+ R(1− cos θ) ≤ W .
For a given distance d in Figure 7.12(a), we seek an angle θ∗ such that car states will
satisfy d + R(1 − cos θ) ≤ W in the subsequent car trajectory up to the next renewal for
both anti-clockwise and clockwise controls. That is, such an initial (d, θ∗) is an indiﬀerence
state, so that both anti-clockwise and clockwise controls will maintain feasibility up until the
next renewal. If we can ﬁnd such an indiﬀerence angle θ∗, then for initial angles θ < θ∗, the
anti-clockwise control ensures a valid subsequent trajectory, while for initial angles θ > θ∗,
the clockwise control ensures the same.
Suppose the initial car position is (d, θ) as shown in Figure 7.12(a). If the anti-clockwise
control is used, then, in the worst case, the car can at most reach the state (d1, θ1) shown in
Figure 7.12(b) with4 d1 = R(cos θ−cos θ1)−d and θ1 = α+θ. Since we require (d1, θ1) ∈ SC ,
we need
R(1 + cos θ − 2 cos (α + θ))− d ≤ W, (7.8)
to ensure that feasibility is maintained until the next renewal.
4Note that d1 ≥ 0 by convention since it is the absolute distance from the median.
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(b) Trajectory subset enclosure for Case II
Figure 7.12: Initial states and trajectories for Case II
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Similarly, if the clockwise control is used, then, in the worst case, the car can at most
reach the state (d2, θ2) with d2 = R(cos θ − cos θ2) + d and θ2 = α − θ, as shown in Figure
7.12(b). Since we also require (d2, θ2) ∈ SC , we need
R(1 + cos θ − 2 cos (α− θ)) + d ≤ W, (7.9)
to ensure that feasibility is maintained until the next renewal.
Suppose the left-hand side (LHS) expressions of both (7.8) and (7.9) are equal for some
θ∗. We can then equate the two expressions to get
sin θ∗ =
d
2R sinα
. (7.10)
Since the θ∗ in (7.10) is such that the LHS expressions of (7.8) and (7.9) are equal, the
initial state (d, θ∗) will satisfy both these inequalities if and only if the sum of these LHS
expressions is bounded by 2W , i.e.,
(R(1 + cos θ∗ − 2 cos (α + θ∗))− d) + (R(1 + cos θ∗ − 2 cos (α− θ∗)) + d) ≤ 2W
This inequality can be simpliﬁed to get
(1 + cos θ∗ − 2 cos θ∗ cosα) ≤ W
R
.
Since W = R(1− cos β(2 cosα− 1)), the above inequality is equivalent to
cos θ∗(2 cosα− 1) ≥ cosβ(2 cosα− 1). (7.11)
Since α ≤ π/3, the above inequality will hold if θ∗ ≤ β.
Recall that θ∗ is such that the LHS expressions of (7.8) and (7.9) are equal. Now, for
θ = 0, the LHS of (7.8) becomes R(2 − 2 cosα) − d, which is less than R(2 − 2 cosα) + d,
142
the corresponding value of the LHS of (7.9). Hence, for θ = β, if the LHS of (7.8) is greater
than that of (7.9), then the two expressions will be equal by the intermediate value theorem
for some 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ β. So, for θ = β, we need to show that
R(1 + cosβ − 2 cos (α + β))− d ≥ R(1 + cosβ − 2 cos (α− β)) + d,
which is equivalent to
cos (β − α)− cos (β + α) ≥ d
R
.
However, from Figure 7.12(a), we see that the maximum value of d = R(cos (β − α) −
cosβ). Hence, the above inequality will hold if
cosβ ≥ cos (β + α),
which is true since (β + α) ≤ π, and cos θ is a decreasing function in the interval [0, π].
Consequently, for a given initial distance d in the subset speciﬁed in Figure 7.12(a), there
indeed exists an orientation θ∗ given by (7.10), such that for the initial position (d, θ∗), both
anti-clockwise and clockwise controls will maintain feasibility until the next renewal. Hence,
if the initial angle θ < θ∗, then the anti-clockwise control will ensure a valid trajectory, and
if θ ≥ θ∗, then the clockwise control will do the same. 
7.2.3 Controllability in a road network
In Section 7.2.2, we have proved that a car can be driven within a straight lane indeﬁnitely,
using feedback with renewal task guarantees. In a road network, however, roads have ﬁnite
lengths, and turns need to be made at intersections. In this section, we show that, given
suﬃciently wide roads, a car can also be driven along such a road network. In the follow-
ing, we use the same car model presented in Section 7.2.1, while taking advantage of the
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availability of the second set of steering controls with the larger turning radius R > R.
The main problem in navigating turns is that a car has to move from one road to another
at their intersection. In particular, the car state (d, θ) satisfying d − R(1 − cos θ) ≤ W on
the ﬁrst road, may not necessarily satisfy this condition in the second road. Hence, the
car must be controlled so that its state is brought back, within a bounded distance, into
the controllable subset corresponding to the second road. If this can be accomplished,
then the car can be controlled to stay withing the roads in a road network as well. The
following theorem shows that, under certain constraints on initial position, a car can indeed
be controlled to get it back into the controllable subset within a bounded distance.
Theorem 7.2.2 If the initial state (d, θ) of a car satisﬁes d ≤ W and θ ≤ π/2, then the
car can be controlled to a state (d1, θ1) that satisﬁes d1 + R(1 − cos θ1) ≤ W with W =
R(1− cosβ(2 cosα− 1)), α ≤ π/3, and β = cos−1 (2 cosα− 1), within a distance of at most
L =
2γRR
R− R, (7.12)
where γ satisﬁes d + R(1− cos(θ − γ)) ≤ W .
Proof In the following, we only consider initial car positions in the lower half of the lane,
since a symmetrical argument applies to the upper half as well.
Suppose the car is initially in a state (d, θ) with d ≤ W , but with d+R(1− cos θ) > W .
Since d ≤ W , there is an angle γ such that d + R(1 − cos(θ − γ)) ≤ W . For instance, the
situation when d = W is illustrated in Figure 7.13. The key observation is that the car
can still be driven within an appropriately displaced lane of width 2W by the same control
strategy used in the proof of Theorem 7.2.1. So, the problem now is to ﬁnd a sequence of
controls that can “shift” this lane so that the “excess” angle oﬀset γ is “negated”.
A control strategy that can be used to negate γ is shown in Figure 7.14. At each point,
the car is controlled as if it is being driven in an appropriately displaced lane, illustrated in
Figure 7.13, using the same control strategy as in the proof of Theorem 7.2.1. When the
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Figure 7.13: Driving the car in a displaced lane
anti-clockwise control is to be applied, we use the control with steering radius R as before.
However, when the clockwise control is to be enforced, we use the control with steering radius
R instead.
As shown in Figure 7.14, the control with the larger steering radius R ensures that the
angle θ at the next control point will be lesser than the θ that it would have been, had we
used the control with steering radius R instead. This is eﬀectively an “improvement” of
(θ − θ) towards negating γ. From Figure 7.14, we also see that (θ − θ) = (θ′ − θ′) and
θ′ =
R ∗ θ′
R
,
and hence the improvement achieved is
θ − θ = θ′
(
R− R
R
)
. (7.13)
Such an improvement is achieved each time we use a clockwise control. Hence, the car
state will be brought back into the controllable subset when θ−θ = γ for clockwise controls.
During this time, the car travels a distance of R ∗ θ′. Also, we use the clockwise control
half the time, since the original control strategy maintains the car within a displaced lane
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Figure 7.14: Control strategy for recovery from a bad initial condition
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Figure 7.15: Controllable subset in a single lane
of ﬁxed width by Theorem 7.2.1. Hence, the maximum distance that the car travels by the
time we have θ − θ = γ is L = 2R ∗ θ′, and by (7.13), this is given by
L =
2γRR
R− R.
It may be noted, however, that the car may recover quicker than the worst case described
above, since it also moves the closer to the center of the lane as d < d by Figure 7.14. 
We now consider how a car can be controlled at the intersection of two roads. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 7.15. In this ﬁgure, Region 1 is the area such that, if the
car is seen there at a renewal time, and the appropriate control corresponding to Road 1
is applied, then the car may move beyond the lower edge of Road 2 before it is seen next.
Region 2 is the area in which the car is seen one iteration before it is seen in Region 1. In
the following lemma, we show that a car can indeed be controlled at such an intersection as
well.
Lemma 7.2.3 If two roads intersect at an angle γ ∈ [0, π/2] (cf. Figure 7.15), and each
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road is at least 2(W +R(1− cos γ)) units wide with W = R(1− cosβ(2 cosα−1)), α ≤ π/3,
and β = cos−1 (2 cosα− 1), then a car starting at a position (d, θ) with d+R(1−cos θ) ≤ W
on the ﬁrst road, can be controlled so that it will satisfy this condition on the second road,
within a distance of
L =
2γRR
R− R.
Proof The basic idea in the control strategy is that when the car crosses the boundary
between Regions 1 and 2 in Figure 7.15, we assume that the car is in Road 2 and send
appropriate controls. When the car enters Region 1, we can have one of the following cases:
1. The car can be in the controllable subset d + R(1− cos θ) ≤ W of Road 2 as well. In
this case, we are done since feasibility with respect to the Road 2 can thereafter be
maintained by Theorem 7.2.1.
2. The car can be outside the controllable subset, but still satisfy d ≤ W and d +R(1−
cos θ) ≤ d + R(1 − cos (θ + γ)). In this case, the car can be brought back to the
controllable subset in Road 2 by Theorem 7.2.2. In particular, since the maximum
angle is γ when the car is a distance d = W , the car can be maintained within a road
of width 2(W + R(1− cos γ)) by the control strategy in Theorem 7.2.2.
3. The car can be outside the controllable subset with d > W or d + R(1 − cos θ) >
d + R(1− cos (θ + γ)).
We now address the third case. There are two possible ways the car could end up in state
3: below the center of the second lane, or above it. Since the car is seen before it goes oﬀ
the lower edge of the second lane, if the car is below the center of the second lane, then we
will have d < W . In addition, we can use the anti-clockwise steering in Region 2 to ensure
that d+R(1− cos θ) ≤ d+R(1− cos (θ + γ)) as well. On the other hand, if the car is above
the center of the second lane, then we can again use the anti-clockwise steering in Region 2
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to ensure that the car ends up in cases 1 or 2. 
We can now prove that a car can be driven in a city road network.
Theorem 7.2.4 In a road network with single-lane straight roads of length at least
L =
2γRR
R− R.
and lane-width at least 2(W + R(1− cos γ)) with W = R(1 − cosβ(2 cosα − 1)), α ≤ π/3,
and β = cos −1(2 cosα− 1), a car can be driven so that it stays within the corresponding
lanes.
Proof Since the roads in the network are straight, by Theorem 7.2.1, a car can be driven
within a lane on such a road. Also, if we make the car normally drive in a suﬃciently narrow
sub-lane within each lane, then at intersections, a car can be properly controlled from a lane
on an incoming road to a lane on the outgoing road by Lemma 7.2.3. Hence, a car can be
driven so that it stays within speciﬁed lanes in the road network. 
7.3 System-wide safety and liveness guarantees
In this section, we use results from previous sections to prove system-wide safety and liveness
guarantees in the traﬃc control testbed.
The Supervisor is the higher level control component that regulates the behavior of all
the cars in the testbed as shown in Figure 5.1. In particular, the Supervisor for city traﬃc
control also ensures that cars are scheduled so that there are no conﬂicts or gridlocks [28].
As described in Section 2.2, the basic approach is to map the road network into a discrete
graph. A road is modeled as a path of bins, and the edges between bins show how cars
can be moved between these bins. On the other hand, an intersection is modeled using the
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(a) Intersection in a road network (b) Sub-graph modeling an intersection
Figure 7.16: Modeling intersections in road network discretization
pattern shown in Figure 7.16. In Figure 7.16(b), we see that there exist pairs of edges along
which cars cannot be simultaneously without collisions. This is modeled by the concept of
edge conﬂicts, whereby, cars cannot be simultaneously moved along conﬂicting edges.
Cars are initially assigned to respective bins in the road network graph. The traﬃc
scheduling problem is then modeled as computing schedules for moving cars along edges so
that there are no conﬂicts or gridlocks. As noted above, conﬂicts are eliminated by deﬁning
appropriate edge conﬂicts. On the other hand, gridlocks basically consist of an occupied
cycle in graph, i.e., a cycle of bins in the graph occupied by cars such that each car needs
to move to the next bin in the cycle.
Now we invoke the guaranteed property of the traﬃc scheduling algorithm from [28]:
Theorem 7.3.1 If the directed graph G modeling a road network is such that each bin has
either in-degree 1 or out-degree 1, the system has no occupied cycle initially, and cars exit the
system after reaching their destinations, then the supervisory algorithm schedules the system
so that all cars reach their destinations in ﬁnite time.
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Proof The main idea of the supervisory algorithm is to move cars along edges so that
there are no conﬂicts, and no occupied cycles are formed. It can also be shown that, if there
are no occupied cycles, and each bin in the road network graph has either in-degree 1 or
out-degree 1, then it is always possible to move a car so that no occupied cycles are formed
consequently. Since cars have ﬁnite routes to their destinations, it then follows that all cars
reach their destinations in ﬁnite time. The detailed proof is presented in [28]. 
The next theorem shows that the discrete model requirement of at most one car in a bin
at any given time, can indeed be enforced in continuous time.
Theorem 7.3.2 In a road network satisfying the model of Theorem 7.3.1, cars can indeed
be scheduled so that there is at most one car in a bin at any given time.
Proof The scheduling algorithm in Theorem 7.3.1 ensures that there are at most two cars
in a bin at a given time. This occurs when the next car enters a bin while the previous car
has not completely left it. However, we can ensure that at most one car is in a bin at a given
time by introducing a “virtual” car in front of each real car in the system. Speciﬁcally, the
virtual car has the same route as the corresponding real car, and ensures that the bin in
front of each real car is empty. 
We now prove main result in this chapter assuming the car model of Section 7.2.1.
Theorem 7.3.3 In a road network with single-lane straight roads of length at least
L =
2γRR
R− R.
and lane-width at least 2(W + R(1− cos γ)) with W = R(1 − cosβ(2 cosα − 1)), α ≤ π/3,
and β = cos−1 (2 cosα− 1), a set of cars can be driven along pre-speciﬁed routes without
collisions (safety guarantee) or gridlocks (liveness guarantee).
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Proof Since the roads have single lanes and are suﬃciently long and wide, by Theorem
7.2.4, a single car can be driven so that it stays within the corresponding lane. Also, since
the network only has single lane roads, the corresponding road network graph satisﬁes the
constraints of Theorem 7.3.1 as shown in Figure 7.16. Further, by Theorem 7.3.2, the cars
can be scheduled so that there is at most one car in a bin at any given time, so that there
are no collisions. Consequently, multiple cars can be operated so that there are no conﬂicts
or gridlocks. 
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS
We now summarize our main contributions in this thesis, and conclude with a vision of
general purpose control for the future.
In this thesis, we have made the case that a key to the proliferation of networked control
systems lies in solving the problem of software management in these systems. We have argued
that, unlike earlier analog and digital control systems, the technological and theoretical
aspects of design of these systems are not very well understood, and in particular, the
complexities in these systems are mainly in the development and management of control
software, besides the fundamental theoretical issues in decentralized control. Our thesis
is that a well-designed middleware framework is a central ingredient in addressing these
challenges.
Thus motivated, we have presented a middleware framework for networked control sys-
tems. Our eﬀorts have been focused on a traﬃc control testbed, which we have used as a
prototype to study networked control systems. Speciﬁcally, we have used an exploratory
implementation of the testbed to understand the requirements of such systems in general,
and motivate the design of Etherware, our middleware for networked control.
We have presented Etherware both from a middleware designer’s perspective as well as
an application developer’s perspective. We have described the programming model, archi-
tecture, and mechanisms of Etherware, and described how to develop applications using
them. In particular, we have described the Etherware based design and implementation of
our traﬃc control testbed, and illustrated the design of distributed control loops through a
detailed case study. This is one of the key contributions of this thesis.
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Next, we have built on this to study the importance of safety and security issues in
networked control systems. In particular, we have considered a system-wide perspective
to safety, whereby exceptional incidents such as security breaches can be addressed by ap-
propriate Strategies for Incident Response (SIR). In addition, we have also presented an
Etherware based Control System Incident Response (CSIR) framework for incorporating
SIRs into operational systems. Further, we have advocated and illustrated the principle of
safety preserving security trade-oﬀs, which states that high-level security overrides such as
mandatory supervision, must not disable low-level safety features such as collision avoidance
in traﬃc systems.
We have addressed the issue of how to establish system-wide guarantees. We have done
this by proving system-wide safety and liveness guarantees in the testbed, based on various
sub-system level guarantees. Speciﬁcally, we have proved that under a renewal task model
based control model for cars, the traﬃc control testbed can be operated without car collisions
or gridlocks. We have also presented accompanying scheduling policies for renewal task
models as part of this analysis. This type of analysis can potentially serve as an example
for other networked control systems of the future.
8.1 Vision for the future
We have presented a middleware framework that supports the development of manageable
and reusable software for networked control systems. While our primary motivation has
been the proliferation of networked control, our contributions, it is hoped, enable more than
the systematic design of distributed control loops that characterize these systems. Our
framework provides a basis for general purpose control.
By general purpose control, we mean the notion of using generic components as building
blocks for control applications. These components could be standardized sensors, actuators,
and controllers that incorporate both hardware and software capabilities, so that they can be
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seamlessly assembled or integrated into control loops dynamically. For instance, a building-
wide distributed temperature control system could automatically detect and integrate new
sensors and air-conditioning units, while still maintaining proper control of temperatures
inside the building. The controllers of an automated car could add a new sensor device, such
as a GPS unit, and exploit the additional sensor feedback available. Such cars could dynam-
ically integrate into an autonomous traﬃc system and use advisories for traﬃc conditions.
The possibilities are immense.
Our middleware framework provides a basis for this vision by supporting the necessary
interoperability for independently developed control software. Our framework can be used
to develop libraries of generic control software, which can then be used as high-level design
primitives for implementing new control systems. In particular, such software can be bundled
together with corresponding control components to form the building blocks for operational
control systems. This lays the foundations for general purpose control, where users can
essentially synthesize new working applications from such components.
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